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THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN TEXAS
Martin A. Frey*
One of the most frustrating tasks facing a lawyer when he
researches in an area of active legislative reform is to determine
speedily and with certainty the relative validity of a case once
precedent. Would, for example, the 1937 criminal court conviction of
a 9-year-old for murder be possible today even though new juvenile
court legislation has been enacted? What about the 1949 holding that
the juvenile court was not required to warn the child of his privilege
against self-incrimination prior to testifying? The 1910 decision that
juvenile court jurisdiction was based on age at the time of trial, not at
the time of the offense? On the theorem that history is relevant, this
article will explore the evolution of juvenile court jurisdiction and
procedure in Texas.
THE PRE-JUVENILE COURT PERIOD: 1836-1907
A. Infancy Defense to Criminal Prosecution
On March 2, 1836, Texas declared its independence from Mexico;
Mexican authority came to an end with the Battle of San Jacinto, April
21, 1836. In 1840 the Republic of Texas adopted the English common
law, which it carried with it when admitted to the Union, December
29, 1845.' Implicit in the common law was a limitation on the criminal
responsibility of children. A child under 14 years of age was presumed
to be incapable of criminal responsibility. This presumption was
irrebuttable for children under 7 and rebuttable for children between 7
and 14.2 In 1857 the ages were changed by statute to 9 and 13
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
I. Tex. Laws 1840, An Act to adopt the Common Law of England § 1, at 3, 2 GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TExAS 177 (1898), now TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1 (1969).
2. Queen v. Smith, I Cox Crim. Cas. 260 (1845); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22-
24; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1969). Reference to the common law presumptions
appeared in Ake v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 398 (1879).
In addition to the defense of infancy, some offenses have been drafted so that they could be
committed only by a person who had attained the age of 21. Schenault v. State, 10 Tex. Ct. App.
410 (1881) (aggravated assault or battery on a female or a child); cf. Jones v. State, 31 Tex. Crim.
252, 20 S.W. 578 (1892) (selling mortgaged property). Other cases have been unsuccessful in
raising this defense. Neal v. State, 101 S.W. 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907) (swindling); Lively v.
State, 74 S.W. 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903) (swindling).
210 TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW [Vol. 1:209
respectively.3 Under this statute the burden of proof shifted twice before
a conviction could be had. The initial burden of proving the
commission of the offense was on the state. The burden then shifted
to the defendant to establish that he was between 9 and 13. It then
shifted back to the state to show that although between 9 and 13 he
had discretion to understand the nature and illegality of the act
constituting the offense.' Once the burden had shifted back to the state,
the most obvious failure to carry this burden occurred when the state
made no effort to prove that the defendant had discretion.5 When an
attempt was made, its sufficiency was then in issue. Proof that
defendant knew good from evil, or right from wrong, or that he was
possessed of the intelligence of ordinary boys of his age was not
sufficient.' The proof must have shown that he understood the nature
of the act and that the act was illegal. This could be shown by
circumstances, education, habits of life, general character, and moral
and religious instruction.7
In 1904, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a rape
conviction which had been based on the testimony of the 7-year-old
3. TEX. PEN. CODE art. 36 (1857):
No person shall in any case be convicted of any offence committed before he was of
the age of nine years; nor of any offence committed between the years of nine and
thirteen, unless it shall appear by proof that he had discretion sufficient to understand
the nature and illegality of the act constituting the offence.
Article 36 became TEX. PEN. CODE art. 34 (1879). Under this provision a person became 9 or 13
years of age the day before the 9th or 13th anniversary of his birthday. Lenhart v. State, 33 Tex.
Crim. 504, 27 S.W. 260 (1894).
4. Ake v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 398, 419 (1879). The defendant has not always established
that he was between 9 and 13 at the time of commission of the offense. For example, in McDaniel
v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 475 (1879), the minor defendant failed to introduce evidence that he
was between 9 and 13 and thus was convicted of killing a dog and fined $10 without the state
having to prove that he had discretion sufficient to understand the nature and illegality of the
act constituting the offense.
5. Gardiner v. State, 33 Tex. 692 (187 1), (conviction of boy under 13 for horse-stealing with
7-year penitentiary sentence reversed and dismissed); Allen v. State, 37 S.W. 757 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1896) (conviction of 10-year-old boy for theft reversed).
6. Simmons v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 527, 97 S.W. 1052 (1906); Price v. State, 50 Tex. Crim.
71, 94 S.W. 901 (1906); Keith v. State, 33 Tex. Crim..341, 26 S.W. 412 (1894); Carr v. State,
24 Tex. Ct. App. 562, 7 S.W. 328 (1888); Parker v. State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 451 (1886).
7. Allen v. State, 37 S.W. 757 (rex. Crim. App. 1896). The court's charge to the jury was
crucial to the state's burden of proof. In Wusnig v. State, 33 Tex. 651 (187 1), the defendant, about
12 at the time of the shooting, was indicted for murder, tried and convicted of manslaughter, and
sentenced to 2 years in the penitentiary. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
new trial because the court's charge to the jury violated the infancy statute in that it withdrew
from the jury any consideration of the question of infancy and responsibility, excepting so far as
it would tend to reduce murder to manslaughter. For additional errors in a court's instructions
to the jury on the presumption of incapacity, see Binkley v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 54, 100 S.W.
780 (1907).
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victim. The court held that article I, section 5 of the Texas Constitution
dictated that
if a person cannot be punished for perjury, who takes an oath as a
witness, such an oath is not binding, and such person cannot be a
witness in a case involving life or liberty; and a conviction based in
whole or in part upon the testimony of such a witness cannot be
sustained. . . . We respectfully call the attention of the Legislature
to this condition, as it may follow in many cases, especially injuries
committed on children of tender years, that the guilty party may
escape punishment, however intelligent the witness may be, and
however capable of understanding the nature and obligation of an
oath, simply because such a witness does not testify under the pains
and penalties of perjury, which is required by our Constitution.8
The following year the legislature responded by amending the infancy
statute so that persons under 9 could be competent as witnesses. This
was accomplished by permitting the presumptions of criminal
incapacity to remain the same except for the offense of perjury.9
B. Capital Punishment
In 1857 the death penalty was eliminated for persons who
committed an offense before becoming 17.10 The burden of proof was
on the defendant to establish that he was under 17 at the time of
commission and therefore exempt from the death penalty. This
question was distinct from the state's burden of proving the offense
charged." The elimination of the death penalty for persons under 17
8. Freasier v. State, 84 S.W. 360-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904).
9. Tex. Laws 1905, ch. 59, § I, at 83 (emphasis added):
No person shall in any case be convicted of any offense committed before he was
of the age of nine years, except perjury, and for that only, when it shall appear by proof
that he had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an oath;
nor of any other offense committed between the years of nine and thirteen, unless it
shall appear by proof that he had discretion sufficient to understand the nature and
illegality of the act constituting the offense.
10. TEX. PEN. CODE art. 37 (1857):
A person for an offence committed before he arrived at the age of seventeen years, shall
in no case be punished with death, but may, according to the nature and degree of the
offence be punished by imprisonment for life, or receive any of the other punishments
affixed in this Code, to the offence of which he is guilty.
Article 37 became TEX. PEN. CODE art. 35 (1879).
i1. Perry v. State, 44 Tex. 473, 480 (1876) (first-degree murder conviction with death
sentence reversed and remanded for new trial) (court suggested that in new trial fuller investigation
be given to whether defendant was under 17 at time of commission); Wilcox v. State, 32 Tex.
Crim. 284, 22 S.W. 1109 (1893) (rape conviction with death penalty reversed and remanded)
(evidence showed that defendant was under 17 at time of commission); Ellis v. State, 30 Tex. Ct.
19701
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had further ramifications. For example, removal of the death penalty
reduced first-degree murder from a capital to a noncapital offense. The
defendant was now entitled to bail. 2
C. Place of Confinement
In 1857 legislation was enacted which stated that confinement of
persons who committed an offense before becoming 17 was to be in the
house of correction instead of in the penitentiary.'3 Whether this was
ever implemented seems doubtful since the judgments rendered after the
enactment of the statute prescribed confinement in the penitentiary with
no mention of the house of correction." In 1887 a house of correction
and reformatory was established for the confinement of persons under
16 when conviction was for a felony and imprisonment was assessed
at 5 years or less.' In 1889 confinement in the house of correction and
reformatory was expressly limited to males.'" Girls were sent to the
penitentiary.'7 The 1889 provision also gave the jury discretion whether
App. 601, 18 S.W. 139, 140 (1892) (first-degree murder with death penalty) (burden of proving
that defendant was under 17 was on defendant); Ingram v. State, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 33, 14 S.W.
457 (1890) (rape conviction with death penalty reversed and remanded) (evidence that boy was
17 at commission was insufficient); Walker v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 503, 13 S.W. 860 (1890)
(first-degree murder) (district attorney admitted as a fact that defendant was under 17 at time of
commission); Ake v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 398, 420 (1879) (rape conviction with death sentence
affirmed) (defendant did not carry burden of proving that he was under 17), discussed in Jones
v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 1, 11-12, 14-15 (1882).
12. Exparte Walker, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 246, 13 S.W. 861 (1889).
13. TEX. PEN. CODE art. 77 (1857):
Where it appears by the proof on the trial of a cause that the offender was at the time
of the commission of the offence, not over the age of seventeen years, he shall be sent
to the House of Correction, in all cases where a person over that age would be liable
to imprisonment in the Penitentiary for the same offence.
Article 77 does not appear in TEx. PEN. CODE (1879).
14. Gardiner v. State, 33 Tex. 692 (1871) (boy under 13 sentenced to 7 years in
penitentiary); Wusnig v. State, 33 Tex. 651 (1871) (boy about 12 at commission sentenced to 2
years in penitentiary); Parker v. State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 451 (1886) (12-year-old boy sentenced
to 2 years in penitentiary); Jones v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 1 (1882) (5 years in penitentiary).
15. Tex. Laws 1887, ch. 84, §§ 1-10, at 64-66.
16. Tex. Laws 1889, ch. 85, §§ 1-16, at 95-98. Tex. Laws 1889, ch. 85, §§ 11, 12, at 97,
replaced Tex. Laws 1887, ch. 84, §§ 6, 7, respectively. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1145 (1895)
codified Tex. Laws 1889, ch. 85, § 12, as amended, Tex. Laws 1895, ch. 68.
17. The limitation to males only was expressed in Ex parte Creel, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 439,
16 S.W. 256 (1891), in which a female under 16 was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 2
years in the reformatory. The superintendent of the reformatory refused to accept her and she
was taken to the penitentiary. In granting her writ of habeas corpus from the penitentiary on the
ground that she could not be taken to a place other than that which the judgment provided, the
court compared the 1887 and 1889 statutes and noted that where the 1887 statute had referred
to "all the persons" and "his or her sentence" the 1889 statute now referred to "all male
persons" and "his sentence." Accord, Ex parte Matthews, 38 Tex. Crim. 617, 44 S.W. 153
(1898).
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to send the boy to the house of correction and reformatory or to the
penitentiary.'8 The judge was required to instruct the jury to find
specially in the verdict the age of the youthful offender and to specify
the place of confinement.' 9 The verdict was fatally defective if it did not
find the age of the defendant when the question of place of confinement
was raised.20 However, if the verdict failed to name the place of
confinement, the place could be set by the judge.2 ' Failure to state the
place of confinement in the judgment made the judgment fatally
defective. 2
JUVENILE COURT LEGISLATION: 1907-PRESENT
The first juvenile court legislation was enacted in 190 7.2 Two
years later section 9 of the act, dealing with when a child could be
18. At first section 12 was construed as being mandatory on the jury. If the jury found the
defendant 16 or under and assessed the period of confinement at 5 years or less, they would then
have to send him to the reformatory, but if the period of confinement was assessed at more than
5 years they would have to send him to the penitentiary. Washington v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App.
411, 13 S.W. 606 (1890); see Duncan v. State, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 141, 15 S.W. 407, 408 (1890).
Washington v. State was overruled in Hays v. State, 30 Tex. Ct. App. 472, 17 S.W. 1063, 1064
(1891). Section 12 was construed to give the jury discretion on whether to send a defendant who
was 16 or under and was to be confined for 5 years or less to the house of correction and
reformatory or to the penitentiary. Accord, Rocha v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 69, 41 S.W. 611
(1897); Ex parte Wood, 36 Tex. Crim. 7, 34 S.W. 965 (1896); Green v. State, 32 Tex. Crim.
298, 22 S.W. 1094 (1893); Sanchez v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 484, 21 S.W. 364 (1893). In addition,
the defendant's age, not at the date of commission of the offense, but at the time of trial
determines whether he could receive the benefits of section 12. Aikins v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 229,
91 S.W. 790 (1906); Sanchez v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 484,21 S.W. 364 (1893).
19. Simmons v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 527, 97 S.W. 1052 (1906).
20. Lewis v. State, 99 S.W. 1011 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907); Henderson v. State, 50 Tex.
Crim. 620, 99 S.W. 1001 (1907); Bates v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 568, 99 S.W. 551 (1907); Simmons
v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 527, 97 S.W. 1052 (1906); Watson v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 371, 92 S.W.
807 (1906). The issue of age must be properly raised. Ex parte White, 50 Tex. Crim. 473, 98
S.W. 850 (1906) (habeas corpus not available when appeal should have been used); Gutierez v.
State, 47 S.W. 372 (rex. Crim. App. 1898) (age issue could not be raised for the first time in
motion for new trial).
21. Ex parte Wood, 36 Tex. Crim. 7, 34 S.W. 965 (1896) (verdict was for 2 years
imprisonment for burglary with no name of place of confinement; judgment named house of
correction and reformatory as place of imprisonment). Accord, Exparte Matthews, 38 Tex. Crim.
617, 44 S.W. 153 (1898). The jury rendered a verdict that the girl be imprisoned for 5 years in
the state reformatory for second-degree murder. The judgment changed the place of confinement
to the penitentiary since there was no provision for incarcerating girls in the house of correction
and reformatory.
22. Watson v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 371, 92 S.W. 807 (1906). The judgment must specify
an actual place of confinement. Evans v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 485, 34 S.W. 285 (1896) (conviction
for burglary reversed because judgment provided for punishment in "reform school" instead of
in "house of correction and reformatory"). Cf. Ex parte Creel, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 439, 16 S.W.
256 (1891) (judgment provided for girl to be incarcerated in house of correction and reformatory
for boys).
23. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, §§ 1-10, at 137-40, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. tit.
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subject to criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor and when a criminal
court could dismiss a felony prosecution and transfer to juvenile court,
was amended and codified in the revised civil statutes. 24 In 1911 when
the revised civil statutes and the code of criminal procedure were
recodified, the civil statutes included the juvenile court act as it
appeared in 1907, while the code included the juvenile court act as
amended in 1909.25 The juvenile court act in the code was further
amended in 1913 but no comparable amendments were made in the
33b, §§ I-10 (Supp. 1908). Section 10 described the purpose of the act:
This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purposes may be carried out;
that is, that the interests of the child and its reformation shall at all times be the object
in view of proceeding against it; provided, that no costs or expenses incurred in the
enforcement of this act shall be paid by the State.
Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 10, at 140, codified as TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 10 (Supp.
1908); recodified as TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2201 (1911); TEx. CODE CaIM. P. art. 1207 (1911).
In 1913 article 1207 was amended to change "reformation" to *restoration to society." Tex.
Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 12, at 219-20.
The constitutionality of the juvenile court act was upheld in Ex parte Bartee, 76 Tex. Crim.
285, 174 S.W. 1051, 1053 (1915).
24. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § 1, at 101-03, amending Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9. This
version of section 9 was codified as TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1910).
25.
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. Tex. Laws 1913, TEX. CODE CalM. P.
(1911) ch. 112 (1916)
article 1197 section 3 article 1197
1198 4 1198
1199 5 1199
1200 6 1200
1201 7 1201
1202 8 1202
1203 9 1203
1204 t0 1204
1205 13 repealed
1206 11 1206
1207 12 1207
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civil statutes.26 Thus, throughout this early period, two juvenile court
acts were in existence. Although the court of criminal appeals first held
that "it was the intention of the Legislature that all these laws were to
be construed together as one whole, '2 7 it later distinguished this
position and held the juvenile court act in the code dominant. 2
In 1925 all previous juvenile court legislation was repealed and a
new set of laws pertaining to the delinquent child was enacted.1 Except
26.
Tex. Laws 1907, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. *TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ch. 65 tit. 33b (1911), (1914) (1911)
(Supp. 1908)
section I section I article 2191 article 1197
2 2 2192 1198
3 3 2193 1199
4 4 2194 1200
5 5 2195 1201
6 6 2196 1202
7 7 2197 1203
8 8 2198 1204
9, par. 1 9, par. 1 2199
9, par. 2 9, par. 2 2200
Tex. Laws 1909, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT.
ch. 55 tit. 33b
(Supp. 1910)
section 9, par. 1-4 section 9, par. 1-4 1205
9, par. 5-6 9, par. 5-6 1206
Tex. Laws 1907, TEx. REv. CIV. STAT.
ch. 65 tit. 33b
(Supp. 1908)
section 10 section 10 2201 1207
27. The said sections 9 and 10 of the act of 1907, embodied as articles 2199 and 2200
of the Revised Civil Statutes, have neither been amended expressly nor repealed
expressly. Taking the various enactments, we conclude that it was the intention of the
Legislature not to repeal said articles 2199 and 2200. It is a universal rule that repeals
by implication are not favored.
McCallen v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 353, 174 S.W. 611, 613 (1915).
28. McLaren v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 449, 199 S.W. 811 (1917); accord, editor's notes to
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. arts. 2191-2201a (Supp. 1918), (Supp. 1920), art. 2200 (Supp. 1922).
29. The existing code and revised statutes provisions were repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
at 181 (1925), recodified (1936):
Be it further enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas: That all penal laws
and all laws relating to criminal procedure in this State, that are not embraced in this
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for two provisions found in the revised statutes entitled "juvenile
court" and "care of delinquent child" all the laws appeared solely in
the code of criminal procedure.
Although the first proceedings under juvenile court legislation were
not considered criminal,3 this view soon changed,3' and the procedure
remained criminal until 1943 when new legislation was enacted. The
legislature expressed the need for a more realistic method of handling
juvenile delinquency cases, a procedure in the nature of guardianship.32
Thus the provisions in the code of criminal procedure and in the revised
civil statutes relating to delinquent children were repealed 33 and a new
procedure enacted and codified.u In re Dendy, the first case to interpret
Act and that have not been enacted during the present session of the Legislature, be
and the same are hereby repealed. All laws and parts of laws relating to crime omitted
from this Act have been intentionally omitted, and all additions have been intentionally
added, and this Act shall be construed to be an independent Act of the Legislature
enacted under the caption hereof, and the articles contained in this Act, as revised,
re-written, changed, combined and codified shall not be construed as a continuation of
former laws, except as otherwise herein provided.
The new juvenile code appeared as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1083-93 (1925). TEX. CODE CRIM.
P. arts. 1083-93 (1936) recodified TEX. CODE CRM. P. arts. 1083-93 (1925), as amended, Tex.
Laws 1927, ch. 163, §§ 1-2, at 236-37.
30. Exparte Bartee, 76 Tex. Crim. 285, 174 S.W. 1051, 1053 (1915).
31. Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389, 391-92 (1918) (motion for rehearing);
Ex parte McLoud, 82 Tex. Crim. 299, 200 S.W. 394, 397 (1917). Under the 1925 Code of
Criminal Procedure the juvenile court proceedings were still classified as criminal. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. P. arts. 1095, 1093 (1925).
32. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 25, at 319.
33. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 24, at 318, repealed TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1084-93
(1936); Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 492, § i, at 1328 (substitute provision for TEX. CODE CRiM. P. art.
1083 (1936)); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2329 (1925), (1936); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338
(1925), (1936), as amended, Tex. Laws 1941, ch. 193, § I, at 355.
34. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, §§ I to 24-A, were codified as TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art.
2338-1, §§ I to 24-A (Supp. 1943). Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 24, at 318 (laws repealed) and
§ 25, at 319 (time of taking effect) did not appear in the codification. The new act was held con-
stitutional in In re Dendy, 175 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943), aff'd sub nom.
Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); Steed v. State, 180 S.W.2d 446, 448
(Tex. Civ. App. -Texarkana), rev'd on other grounds, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458 (1944). For
a discussion of delinquency under the 1943 act, see B. ANDERSON & R. GURLEY, THE JUVENILE
OFFENDER AND TEXAS LAW (rev. ed. 1966); Gardner, What Reforms Are Needed in the Texas
Juvenile Court Statute?, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 870 (1960); Hughes, Handling of Juvenile Delin-
quents in Texas, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 870 (1960); Hughes, Handling of Juvenile Delinquents in
quents in Texas, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 290 (1960); Comment, The New Juvenile Delinquency Act, 23
TEXAS L. REV. 165 (1945). For a discussion of the law prior to 1943, see Comment, Adolescent
Delinquency and Youth Correction Authority Act, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 754 (1942); Comment,
Juvenile Delinquency, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 590 (1942).
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the new law, the court of civil appeals held it to be neither criminal
nor civil.3 The supreme court leaned more heavily on civil procedure:
[T]he Act repeals by specific mention certain articles of both the civil
statutes and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and all laws or parts
of laws in conflict therewith. The Act provides for a jury trial when
a jury is demanded, and authorizes the trial court to order a jury on
its own motion. Nothing is said about the payment of a jury fee. The
Act does not require a minor to testify against himself in a proceeding
under same, and it does not require the trial court to follow the rules
of civil procedure in taking testimony in the trial of such cases. We
think, however, that the whole Act discloses that the Legislature
intended that proceedings instituted thereunder should be governed, as
far as practicable, by the rules relating to civil procedure.36
A. The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between Juvenile and Criminal
Courts
The first juvenile court act gave the county and district courts
jurisdiction as juvenile courts.3 1 In 1925 the criminal district court was
added to the list of available courts.3 1 It was temporarily removed
between 1943 and 1945. 31 The legislature in 1949 created a juvenile
35. 175 S.W.2d 297, 302 (fex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943):
The Act sets up a complete jurisdiction and procedure for the hearing of juvenile
delinquent cases and there is no other law, civil or criminal, to govern such cases and
situations as defined by the Act and placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court provided for in this Act. Nowhere does the Act provide that either
criminal or civil procedure shall be followed.
36. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944), noted in 26 TEXAs L. REv.
819 (1948); accord, Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458, 459 (1944); Hultin v. State,
171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961); Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ); Lee v. McKay, 414 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1967, writ dism'd); Gamble v. State, 405 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966,
no writ); In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Mendoza v. Baker, 319 S.W.2d 147 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ); In re Brown, 201
S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 2, at 138. Section 2 was codified as TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 2 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2192 (1911), (1914), and
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1198 (1911), construed in Exparte Meggs, 99 Tex. Crim. 391, 269
S.W. 790 (1925); Ex parte Fowler, 85 Tex. Crim. 436, 213 S.W. 271 (1919). The court, in Ex
parte Davis, 85 Tex. Crim. 218, 211 S.W. 456 (1919), ruled that the legislature had the power to
confer this jurisdiction.
38. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2329 (1925), (1936). For special legislation concerning
Cameron County, see Tex. Laws 1931, ch. 307, § 2, at 769.
39. In 1943 the criminal district court was removed from the list. Tex. Laws 1943, ch.
204, § 4, at 314, codified as TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 4 (Supp. 1943). But in 1945
it returned when section 4 of the 1943 juvenile court act was amended to add the criminal district
courts and to provide that appeals from these courts be taken to the court of civil appeals. Tex.
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court in counties having 10 or more district courts and having a
juvenile board composed of the district judges and the county judge of
that county 0 In 1953 the aspect in the law which made it impossible
for some counties to have a resident juvenile judge was remedied by
permitting the county court to be designated the juvenile court as well
as the district court and the criminal district court." Beginning in 1949,
domestic relations courts began to be created for individual counties . 2
When several courts had juvenile court jurisdiction their
concurrent jurisdiction caused confusion. 1909 legislation authorized
the judges of the courts eligible to be juvenile courts to select one of
the courts to handle all cases arising under the juvenile court law.4 3 In
Laws 1945, ch. 35, § I, at 52, amending Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 4, at 314. The amended
provision was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 4 (1948). This provision was
amended in 1949. Tex. Laws 1949, ch. 368, § 1, at 702-03. In 1951 the legislature enacted this
same piece of legislation that they had enacted in 1949. Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 156, §§ 1-4, at 270-
72. The purpose for this second enactment does not appear in the statute. The amended version
was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 4 (1964).
40. Tex. Laws 1949, ch. 283, §§ 1-4, at 518.
41. Tex. Laws 1953, ch. 165, § 1, at 475-76.
42. Tex. Laws 1949, ch. 426, §§ 1-16, at 792-95 (Potter County); Tex. Laws 1953, ch.
325, §§ 1-18, at 799-802 (Harris County); Tex. Laws 1955, ch. 49, §§ 1-13, at 75-78
(Hutchinson County); Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 16, §§ 1-25, at 20-24 (Smith County); Tex. Laws,
2d Spec. Sess. 1957, ch. 23, §§ 1-2, at 185-86, amending Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 16, §§ 2, 6; Tex.
Laws 1957, ch. 511, §§ 1-22, at 1490-93 (Dallas County) (juvenile and domestic relations courts);
Tex. Laws 1959, ch. 31, §§ 1-21, at 56-59 (Nueces County); Tex. Laws 1959, ch. 143, §§ 1-2,
at 248-49, amending Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 511, §§ 21-22 (Dallas County); Tex. Laws 1959, ch.
242, §§ 1-18, at 540-44 (domestic relations courts numbers 2 and 3 for Harris County); Tex.
Laws 1959, ch. 331, §§ 1-5, at 727 (juvenile court for Ector County); Tex. Laws 1959, ch.
443, §§ 1-25, at 952-55 (Gregg County); Tex. Laws, 3d Spec. Sess. 1959, ch. 13, §§ 1-18, at
389-92 (domestic relations court number 2 for Dallas County); Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 159, §§ I-
19, at 305-08 (Jefferson County); Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 291, §§ 1-3, at 621-24 (juvenile and county
court number 2 for Galveston County); Tex. Laws, 3d Spec. Sess. 1962, ch. 6, §§ 1-18, at 16-
19 (Tarrant County); Tex. Laws, 3d Spec. Sess. 1962, ch. 64, §§ 1-22, at 171-75 (Galveston
County); Tex. Laws 1963,.ch. 44, §§ 1-23, at 64-67 (Taylor County); Tex. Laws 1963, ch.
299, §§ 1-19, at 778-82 (domestic relations court number 4 for Harris County); Tex. Laws 1965,
ch. 278, §§ 1-17, at 548-51 (domestic relations court number 2 for Tarrant County); Tex. Laws
1965, ch. 289, §§ 1-20, at 569-71 (juvenile court for Harris County); Tex. Laws 1965, ch.
307, §§ 1-28, at 618-23 (Brazoria County); Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 537, §§ 1-24, at 1142-45
(Midland County); Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 694, §§ 1-4, at 1623-24, amending Tex. Laws, 3d Spec.
Sess. 1962, ch. 6, §§ 1-18 (Tarrant County).
In 1967 the legislature amended the various statutes that pertained to jurisdiction of domestic
relations and juvenile courts for named counties. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 565, §§ 1-19, at 1242-53.
For a discussion of these courts, see Stokes, Special Courts for Domestic Relations, 12 TEX. BJ.
153 (1949).
In 1957 legislation was enacted to provide for juvenile court referees in counties having a
population of 806,700 or more. Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 186, §§ 1-7, at 384-85. In 1965 referees were
authorized for juvenile and district courts of Wichita County. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 612, §§ I-Il,
at 1350-51.
43. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § I, at 101-03, amending Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9. This
1970] JUVENILE COURT EVOLUTION
1943 the authority to designate the juvenile court was shifted to the
juvenile board, if the county had one."
Juvenile courts have jurisdiction over delinquent children. What
then is a delinquent child? Two factors are required: he must be within
the requisite age to be classified a child and his conduct must be
proscribed as delinquent. In 1907 the requisite age for being classified
a child within the delinquency statute was under 16.1 5 The upper
delinquency age was raised in 1913 from a child under 16 to any male
under 17 and any female under 18.46 In 1937 the legislature became
concerned with the fact that under existing law a boy or girl of tender
age, convicted of being a delinquent child, could be sent to a training
school where he or she would be associated with delinquent children up
to the age of 21. This led to the establishment of a minimum age of
10 for the delinquent child. 7 With the minimum age came the problem
that a child of 9 could be convicted in criminal court of a crime since
he was above the age of criminal incapacity and below the age for
was codified in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1910). This provision did not appear
in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (1911) but did appear as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1205 (1911).
44. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 4, at 314, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1,
§ 4 (Supp. 1943). For an application of the statute, see In re Hoskins, 198 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, writ rerd n.r.e.). Cf. Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1948, no writ) (mandamus to compel payment of salary to member of county
juvenile board).
45. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § I, at 137-38. Section I was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
tit. 33b, § I (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2191 (1911) and as TEX.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911).
46. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 3, at 215, amended TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911)
to change the age. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2191 (1911), the corresponding provision in the civil
statutes, was not amended. TEX. CODE CRlM. P. art. 1197 (1911), as amended in 1913, was
codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911), as amended in 1913, was codified as TEX. CODE
CRiM. P. art. 1197 (1916). TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1083 (1925), (1936); Tex. Laws 1943, ch.
204, § 3, at 313, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1943) (1948), and
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1964); Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § I, codified as
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1966); and Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 2, codified
as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1968), retained the use of 17 and 18 years of
age as the maximum delinquency age for boys and girls, respectively.
The marriage of a girl under 18 did not exempt her from the juvenile delinquency statutes.
Phillips v. State, 20 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929), noted in 8 TEXAS L. REV. 584 (1930);
Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. -Galveston 1949, no writ).
47. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1083 (1936) was expressly repealed by Tex. Laws 1937, ch.
492, § 6, at 1330. The new provision, Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 492, § I, at 1328, began: "'The term
'delinquent child' shall include any boy between the ages of ten (10) and seventeen (17) years
and/or any girl between the ages of ten (10) and eighteen (18) years who .... " The minimum
age was retained in Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 3, at 313, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art.
2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1943), (1948) and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 2338-1, § 3 (1964); Tex.
Laws 1965, ch. 577, § I, at 1256, codified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1966);
and Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 2, at 1082, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3
(Supp. 1968).
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juvenile court jurisdiction." This possibility was eliminated in 1967
when the age for criminal incapacity was raised to 15.11
With the enactment of special legislation based on age, the act was
so construed thai the accused would not be entitled to the law's benefits
if he were over the delinquency age at the time of trial. This was true
even if he had been within the age of delinquency at the time of
commission of the offense.
[I]f we should hold otherwise, we would have the anomalous condition
of sending a man to the juvenile court to be confined in the school
for the training of children, and who at the time of the trial might be
40 or 50 years of age, on the ground that he was a juvenile at the
time of the commission of the offense. It was never so intended by
the lawmakers. The object and purpose of this act, together with the
act of the same Legislature making provision for the commitment to
state institutions for the training of juveniles, all persons under the age
of 16 years, was to remove children of tender years from the
association of confirmed felons and bad characters, and place them
under a training for the purpose of developing their character and
fitting them for useful citizenship, and it was never intended by said
act to reach those cases where the man was over 16 years of age at
the time of the trial.50
48. Real v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 178, 103 S.W.2d 741 (1937) (9-year-old convicted of
murder in criminal court-reversed on other grounds).
49. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 7, at 1086, codified as TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 30 (Supp.
1969-1970).
50. Arrandell v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 350, 131 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1910) (Tex. Laws 1909,
ch. 54, § 1, at 100-01) (conviction of first-degree murder affirmed: 15 at commission, 17 at trial);
accord, Smith v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 402, 269 S.W. 793 (1925) (under 17 at commission, over
17 at indictment and trial); Smith v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 409, 266 S.W. 153 (1925) (under 16
at commission and at indictment but became 17 before trial); Watson v. State, 90 Tex. Crim.
576, 237 S.W. 298 (1922) (speedy trial issue when accused was under 17 at commission and at
indictment but became 17 before trial); Fifer v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 282, 234 S.W. 409 (1921)
(under 17 at commission, would be 18 at trial); Stracner v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 89, 215 S.W.
305 (1919) (motion for rehearing) (under 17 at commission, 19 at trial); Jefferson v. Smith, 85
Tex. Crim. 614, 214 S.W. 981 (1919); McLaren v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 449, 199 S.W. 8111, 816
(1917) (dissent).
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1084, 1085 (1925), (1936); see TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1088
(1925), (1936); Hardie v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 368, 144 S.W.2d 571 (1940); Stallings v. State,
129 Tex. Crim. 300, 87 S.W.2d 255 (1935); see Osborne v. Brooks, 75 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ). In Green v. State, 112 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938),
defendant withdrew his appeal because if new trial was ordered then he might be subject to longer
confinement as an adult. Delay in trial for the sole purpose of depriving the accused of his
privilege under the juvenile law would not be sanctioned by the court. The burden of proving such
a delay was on the accused. Walker v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 330, 45 S.W.2d 987 (1932) (accused
did not satisfy burden of proof).
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Enactment of the 1943 juvenile court legislation did not change the
application of juvenile court law to age. Age at the time of trial was
retained.5' Having defined the age limitations for the delinquent child,
let us now consider his conduct. The 1907 juvenile court act defined
the delinquent child as a child
who violates any laws of this State, or any city ordinance; or who is
incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or
immoral persons, or who knowingly visits a house of ill repute; or
who knowingly patronizes or visits any place where any gambling
device is or shall be operated; or who patronizes any saloon or place
where any intoxicating liquors are sold; or who wanders about the
streets in the night time without being on any business or occupation;
or who habitually wanders about any railroad yards or tracks; or who
habitually jumps on or off of any moving train, or enters any car or
engine without lawful authority; or who habitually uses vile, obscene,
vulgar, profane or indecent language; or who is guilty of immoral
conduct in any public place. 52
51. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 275 (1944); Exparte Miranda, 415
S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (2 defendants, one 15 and the other 16 at commission, both
17 at criminal trial for murder); Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (15 at
commission, 17 at criminal trial for murder); Exparte Sawyer, 386 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964) (15 at commission, 17 at criminal trial for two murders); Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim.
425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961) (16 at commission, 17 at criminal trial for murder with malice
aforethought of Ruble, with interim spent at training school because of commitment for
delinquency based on aggravated assault on Lethcoe and murder of Ruble); Martinez v. State,
171 Tex. Crim. 443, 350 S.W.2d 929 (1961) (13 at commission, 17 at criminal trial for murder,
with interim spent at training school because of commitment for delinquency based on assault
with intent to rob, arising out of same incident); Perry v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 282, 350 S.W.2d
21 (1961) (16 at commission, 17 at criminal trial for murder, with interim spent at training school
because of commitment for delinquency based on unlawfully carrying a pistol, part of same
incident); Elliot v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 140, 324 S.W.2d 218 (1959) (16 at commission, 17 at
criminal trial for rape, with interim spent at training school where he was an inmate at time of
the rape); Peterson v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 105, 235 S.W.2d 138, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932
(1951) (girl 17 at commission of murder, 18 at criminal trial); Roberts v. State, 153 Tex. Crim.
308, 219 S.W.2d 1016 (1949) (15 at commission of murder, 17 at trial, with parole from juvenile
training school revoked during the interim); Northern v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 569, 216 S.W.2d
192 (1949); Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947) (16 at commission, 17 at
trial); Dillard v. State, 439 S.W.2d 460 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969, writ ret'd n.r.e.); State
v. Garza, 358 S.W.2d 749 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no writ); State v. Ferrell, 209
S.W.2d 642 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (girl 17 at commission and at
juvenile court hearing that was reversed and remanded; since she was past 18 at time the court
of appeals wrote its opinion, she was no longer within the juvenile court's jurisdiction and any
subsequent trial would be in criminal court); see Solis v. State, 418 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ.
App. -San Antonio 1967, no writ).
52. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § I, at 137-38. Section I was codified as TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
tit. 33b, § I (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2191 (1911), (1914), and
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911).
Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 3, at 215, amended the definition of a delinquent child by deleting
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In 1915 a compulsory education bill was passed which provided for
public school attendance of children between 8 and 14. It specifically
provided that violation of the compulsory education law could be
delinquency.0 In 1918 the part of the statute dealing with felonies and
misdemeanors was held inoperative as applied to girls.5 The legislature
responded by providing a procedure whereby a female under 18 who
was charged with a felony could be tried as a delinquent.55 The 1925
and 1936 codes used basically the 1918 definition for delinquent child
with only minor changes.56 During this period the words incorrigible
and habitual were defined. An incorrigible was one whose reformation
could not be effected by the control to which he was subject, but to
bring it about the intervention of the power of the state would be
necessary.57 Habitual was defined as formed or acquired by or resulting
one "who habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language." TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. art. 2191 (1911) was not amended. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911), as amended in
1913, was codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1916).
53. Tex. Laws 1915, ch. 49, § 9, codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1207c (1916).
54. Exparte McLoud, 82 Tex. Crim. 299, 200 S.W. 394, 396-97 (1917):
We believe that in the absence of some provision such as that contained in article
1195, supra, with reference to boys, exempting them from prosecution under the
ordinary criminal laws of the state, that article 1197 is inoperative in so far as it
occupies the same field as the statutes against felonies and misdemeanors, and that it
is effective only as to that part of the article which is not in conflict with the other
criminal laws of the state (Cole v. State of Texas ex rel. Cobolini, 106 Tex. 472, 170
S.W. 1036); that is to say, that part of it is effective only which defines a delinquent
child as a female under 18 years of age who is incorrigible, or who knowingly associates
with thieves, vicious or immoral persons, or who knowingly visits a house of ill repute,
or who knowingly patronizes or visits any place where any gambling device is or shall
be operated, or who patronizes any saloon or place where any intoxicating liquors are
sold, or who habitually wanders about the streets in the nighttime without being on
any business or occupation, or who habitually wanders about any railroad yards or
tracks, or who is guilty of immoral conduct in any public place; and we believe that
the statute is inoperative in failing to fix any measure by which the jury is authorized
to determine the terms of duration or place of confinement.
55. Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, ch. 26, § I, at 43-44, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 1197 (1916), construed in Williams v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 214, 225 S.W. 173 (1920)
(perjury); Slade v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 358, 212 S.W. 661 (1919). In the process the definition
was amended by changing "who violates any laws of this State, or any city ordinance" to "who
violates any law of this State."
56. "[Wiho violates any law of this State" was changed to "who violates any penal law
of this State"; "who knowingly patronizes or visits any place where any gambling device is or
shall be operated" was changed to "who knowingly patronizes or visits any place where a
gambling device is being operated"; "who habitually jumps on or off of any moving train" was
changed to "habitually jumps on and off moving trains"; and "who patronizes any saloon or
place where any intoxicating liquors are sold" was deleted. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1083 (1925),
(1936). The repeal of article 1083 by Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 492, § 6, at 1330, had no effect on the
acts that would constitute delinquency since the same acts appeared in the new definition. Tex.
Laws 1937, ch. 492, § 1, at 1328.
57. Hogue v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 170, 220 S.W. 96 (1920).
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from habit, frequent use, or custom. Single or occasional acts would
not be habitual.5
A new definition for the delinquent child was adopted in 1943. He
was one
(a) who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of
felony;
(b) or who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of
misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense may
be by confinement in jail;
(c) or who habitually violates any penal law of this state of the
grade of misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such
offense is by pecuniary fine only;
(d) or who habitually violates any penal ordinance of a political
subdivision of this state;
(e) or who habitually violates a compulsory school attendance
law of this state;
(f) or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger
the morals or health of himself or others;
(g) or who habitually associates with vicious and immoral
persons.59
1951 legislation, cumulative with the juvenile court act,60 proscribed
certain motor vehicle conduct committed by a minor between 14 and
17. The provisions were repealed in 1957 and new legislation made
driving while intoxicated by a male 14 to 17 or a female 14 to 18 a
misdemeanor punishable by fine.6 An amendment in 1967 provided
that the plea of guilty be made in open court before the judge and that
there be no conviction except in the presence of one or both parents or
guardians. 2
58. Meggs v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 415, 276 S.W. 262 (1925).
59. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 3, at 313, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1,
§ 3 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1964). In 1965 section
3 was amended but the acts constituting delinquency remained unchanged. Tex. Laws 1965, ch.
577, § 1, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1966). Section 3 was amended
in 1967 but again without change as to the acts constituting delinquency. Tex. Laws 1967, ch.
475, § 2, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 3 (Supp. 1968).
The vagueness of section 3(f) has been raised on several occasions but without success. E.S.G.
v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejected by the
majority); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ)
(concurring opinion).
60. Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 436, §§ 1-5, at 786-87.
61. Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 302, §§ 1-7, at 736-37.
62. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 476, §§ 1-2, at 1086-87. Section la appears in TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 802e, § la (Supp. 1969-1970).
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The 1907 juvenile court act required an arrested child to be taken
directly before the juvenile court. If for any reason he was taken instead
before a justice of the peace or a police court, it was the duty of the
justice of the peace or city judge to transfer the case to the juvenile
court where the case would be heard as if it had been brought there in
the first instance.Y At first the juvenile court act did not require every
case to be brought to juvenile court. Only cases begun in the justice of
the peace or police courts were required to be transferred. There was
no requirement that a felony case on the criminal docket of the district
court had to be transferred. Transfer was left to the discretion of the
criminal court judge. 4 In 1917 discretion was eliminated in favor of
63. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 5, at 139:
[Wihen any child sixteen years of age or under is arrested on any charge, with or
without warrant, such child, instead of being taken before a justice of the peace or any
police court, shall be taken directly before the county or district court, or, if the child
should be taken before a justice of the peace or a police court upon a complaint sworn
out in such court or for any other reason, it shall be the duty of such justice of the
peace or city judge to transfer the case to said county or district court, and in any such
case the court may hear and proceed to dispose of the case in the same manner as if
such child had been brought before the court upon information originally filed as herein
provided.
Section 5 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 5 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2195 (1911), (1914), and as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1201 (1911). In 1913,
Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 7, at 216, amended TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1201 (1911) to change
"any child sixteen. years of age or under" to "any male child under seventeen years of age, or
female child under eighteen years of age." This amended version was recodified as TEX. CODE
CiM. P. art. 1088 (1925), (1936), and construed in Continental Cas. Co. v. Miller, 135 S.W.2d
501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, no writ) (action for damages for unlawful arrest and
imprisonment); Osborne v. Brooks, 75 S.W.2d 963 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
64. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9, at 140:
Whenever it shall appear to the district court of this State that any person being
prosecuted in such court for a felony is a child under sixteen years of age, such court
shall have authority to order such prosecution dismissed and to order such child to be
committed to the juvenile court of the county in which such district court is being held,
for such action and disposition as said juvenile court may think proper in the premises.
Section 9 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1908), construed in Exparte
Thomas, 56 Tex. Crim. 66, 118 S.W. 1053 (1909). In 1909 section 9 was rewritten. Tex. Laws
1909, ch. 55, § 1, at 101-03, amending Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9. This version was codified
as TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1910). The 1911 codification of the civil statutes
included the 1907 and not the 1909 provision. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2200 (1911).
In 1909 the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1895 was amended to provide that when a male
juvenile under 16 was indicted for a felony the judge had the authority to order the prosecution
dismissed and order the juvenile turned over to the juvenile court. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 54, § I,
at 100-01, amending TEx. CODE CRiM. P. art. 1145 (1895). Article 1145, as amended, became
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1911), construed in Ragsdale v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 145, 134
S.W. 234 (1911). The court's discretion was not subject to revision without an abuse of discretion.
Arrandell v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 350, 131 S.W. 1086 (1910). In 1913, article 1195 was amended
by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § i, at 214, so that if the male juvenile was under 17 the judge
"shall dismiss." Although this language would ordinarily be mandatory, it was construed as
1970] JUVENILE COURT EVOLUTION
mandatory transfer.15 The 1943 laws vested the juvenile court with
exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings governing any delinquent
child." In addition the criminal courts were required to transfer to
juvenile court all cases where the defendant was a female between 10
and 18 or a male between 10 and 17.11 The burden of raising and
discretionary in order to be consistent with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2200 (1911), (1914), which
was still in full force. McCallen v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 353, 174 S.W. 611 (1915); accord, Davis
v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 118, 188 S.W. 990 (1916); Townser v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 4, 182 S.W.
1104 (1916). Article 1195, as amended in 1913, appeared as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1916).
In 1918 the code was amended to apply to females under 18. Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918,
ch. 26, § 1, at 44, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1916), construed in Slade v. State,
85 Tex. Crim. 358, 212 S.W. 661 (1919); cf. Ex parte McLoud, 82 Tex. Crim. 299, 200 S.W.
394 (1917); Townser v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 4, 182 S.W. 1104 (1916).
65. The change was judicial. McLaren v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 449, 199 S.W. 811 (1917),
after distinguishing McCallen v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 353, 174 S.W. 611 (1915), and Townser v.
State, 79 Tex. Crim. 4, 182 S.W. 1104 (1916), held that under TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195
(1916) transfer of felony cases was mandatory.
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1084 (1925), (1936) (indictment), construed in Singleton v. State,
104 Tex. Crim. 9, 282 S.W. 804 (1926), combined TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1916) (which
dealt with males) and Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, ch. 26, § 1, at 44 (which dealt with
females). These older acts had required the judge, if satisfied from the evidence that the juvenile
was a male under 17 or a female under 18, to dismiss the prosecution and proceed to try the
juvenile as a delinquent, under the provisions of the act. The new provision required the judge to
transfer the case to the juvenile docket and proceed, under the same indictment, to try the child
as a delinquent. Accord, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1085 (1925), (1936) (information and
complaint).
66. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 5, at 314, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1,
§ 5 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 5 (1964). In 1965 the
last paragraph, pertaining to continued jurisdiction, was amended by Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577,
§ 2, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 5 (Supp. 1966). In 1967 the first paragraph
was amended to provide for waiver of jurisdiction to the appropriate district or criminal district
court, and a fourth paragraph was added to permit criminal proceedings against a child for
perjury. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 3, codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 5 (Supp.
1968).
Transfers could be made between juvenile courts. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 6, at 314,
codified as TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 6 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6 (1964). This paragraph was retained in Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 3,
codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 6 (Supp. 1966). A similar provision appeared in
Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 4, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 6(a) (Supp. 1968):
When a child under the jurisdiction of a court moves from one county to another
the court may transfer the case to the court in the county of the child's residence if
the transfer is in the child's best interest. The transferring court shall forward
transcripts of records in the case to the judge of the receiving court, who shall file them
in the office of his clerk.
67. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 12, at 316, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1,
§ 12 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 12 (1964), construed
in Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944). When section 12 was amended
in 1965, it remained the same except for permitting the criminal court to retain children who have
been transferred there by the juvenile court under section 6. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 4, codified
as TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 12 (Supp. 1966). In Solis v. State, 418 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, no writ), the court held that the juvenile court need not adjudge
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proving juvenility was' on the defendant." The question was a matter
the child a delinquent on the same charge that had brought him before the criminal court. In
Solis the delinquency proceeding was based on assault with intent to murder, while the complaint
before the justice court was for murder with malice. The child's argument was an attempt to
preclude subsequent criminal prosecution for murder with malice once he became 17.
When section 12 was amended again, in 1967, the paragraph was reworded and a new
restriction is found in the last sentence. The addition would seem to strike at the problem raised
in Solis. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 5, codified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 12 (Supp.
1968):
If, while a criminal charge or indictment is pending against any person in a court
other than a juvenile court, it is ascertained that the person is a child at the time of
the trial for the alleged offense, it is the duty of the court in which the case is pending
to transfer the child immediately together with all papers, documents, and records of
testimony connected with the case to the juvenile court of the county unless the child
is being held under the authority of Section 6 of this Act. The transferring court shall
order the child to be taken forthwith to the place of detention designated by the juvenile
court, or to the juvenile court itself, or to release the child to the custody of a probation
officer or any suitable person to appear before the juvenile court or the probation
department of the county at a time designated. The receiving juvenile court shall set
the case for hearing and dispose of the case as if it had been instituted in that court
originally. Unless the child is subsequently transferred by the juvenile court as provided
by Section 6 of this Act, he is not subject to prosecution at any later date for the alleged
offense.
68.
[Trhe parent, guardian, attorney or next friend of said juvenile or said juvenile himself
may file a sworn statement in court setting forth the age of such juvenile at any time
before announcement of ready for trial is made in the case ...
Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 54, § 1, at 100, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1145 (1895). This was
codified as TEX. CODE CRlM. P. art. 1195 (1911), (1916), construed in Valdez v. State, 98 Tex.
Crim. 166, 265 S.W. 161 (1924) (waiver); Robertson v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 350, 243 S.W. 1098
(1922); McRuffin v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 569, 240 S.W. 309 (1922); Fifer v. State, 90 Tex. Crim.
282, 234 S.W. 409 (1921) (waiver of right to be proceeded against as juvenile); Flores v. State,
89 Tex. Crim. 506, 231 S.W. 786 (1921); Lee v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 146, 215 S.W. 326 (1919)
(court cannot refuse to hear juvenility issues). These provisions applied only to male delinquents.
In 1918, Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, ch. 26, § 1, at 43-44, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 1197 (1916), added a similar provision applying to females. The same provision appeared in
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1084 (1925), (1936) (indictment) and TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1085
(1925), (1936) (information and complaint).
The question of age must have been presented at time of trial. Rice v. State, 137 Tex. Crim.
21, 127 S.W.2d 889 (1939) (attempt to raise juvenility issue after court pronounced sentence); Ex
parte Winfield, 74 Tex. Crim. 457, 168 S.W. 92 (1914) (attempt to raise juvenility issue by habeas
corpus after conviction for misdemeanor theft).
With the enactment of the new juvenile court act in 1943, transfer to juvenile court was still
required. However, there still appeared to be a way the defendant could waive juvenile court
jurisdiction without a waiver statute. This in fact occurred in Ex parte Huddleston, 149 Tex.
Crim. 388, 194 S.W.2d 401 (1946), where defendant was brought to criminal court. On his plea
of guilty, he was convicted of felony theft and sentenced to 2 years' confinement irn the
penitentiary. He did not appeal from the conviction. After being convicted, he filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was only 15 at the time of trial and therefore the
criminal court was without jurisdiction. This argument was rejected.
We can regard the proceeding here pursued in no other light than as a collateral
attack against the judgment of conviction upon relator's plea of guilty under facts then
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for the court and not for the jury.' Transfer could also move in the
opposite direction. The early juvenile court had the authority to
transfer misdemeanor cases to criminal court for criminal
prosecution.70 No provision was enacted for the transfer of felony cases
to criminal court. The 1925 Code of Criminal Procedure made no
mention of transfer from juvenile to criminal court. The past practice
of transferring misdemeanor cases that was sanctioned by the revised
civil statutes appeared to be revoked by the general repealing clause of
the 1925 code, with the result that from 1925 to 1965 no transfer was
possible. Then in 1965 the juvenile court was authorized to certify a
child 16 or older at the time of the offense to criminal court for
prosecution as an adult if the offense would have been a felony if
committed by an adult.' The following year Foster v. State held part
of the waiver statute unconstitutional. 2 The net effect of the 1965
before the court which rendered said judgment not void, but- voidable only. If the
burden was upon the state in the first instance to show that relator was more than
seventeen years old, the burden was discharged when upon the hearing under his plea
of guilty relator testified that he was seventeen years old and made the same statement
in his confession introduced in evidence. id. at 393, 194 S.W.2d at 404.
The language of the court poses the interesting problem whether the burden of raising the question
of juvenility had shifted from the accused to the state. Subsequent cases state that the burden
remained on the juvenile. Northern v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 569, 216 S.W.2d 192 (1949); Exparte
Munoz, 152 Tex. Crim. 413, 209 S.W.2d 767 (1948) (attempt to raise juvenility issue by habeas
corpus after conviction for robbery by assault). Failure to raise the question constitutes a waiver.
Bradley v. State, 365 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Exparte Nolden, 172 Tex. Crim. 553,
360 S.W.2d 151 (1962).
69. Tucker v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 490, 43 S.W.2d 103 (931); Robertson v. State, 93
Tex. Crim. 39, 245 S.W. 443 (1922); Robertson v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 350, 243 S.W. 1098
(1922); Flores v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 506, 231 S.W. 786 (1921); Flores v. State, 88 Tex. Crim.
349, 227 S.W. 320 (1921) (trial court's decision, based on sufficient evidence, was binding on the
court of criminal appeals); Jefferson v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 614, 214 S.W. 981 (1919).
The representatives of the state were prohibited from making an admission as to age. The
male accused must prove to the court by "full and sufficient evidence" that he was less than 17.
Hardie v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 368, 144 S.W.2d 571 (1940); Smith v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 409,
266 S.W. 153 (1924).
70. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9, at 140. Section 9 was codified as TEX. RaV. CIv. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1908). In 1909 Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § 1, at 101-03, amended Tex. Laws
1907, ch. 65, § 9. This version of section 9 was codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9
(Supp. 1910) and TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1205 (1911). TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2199 (1911)
recodified the 1907 version of section 9. In 1913 TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1205 (1911) was
expressly repealed by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 13, at 220. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2199
(1911) was not amended or expressly repealed but was recodified as Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. art.
2199 (1914). The result was that article 2199 was still in force and the juvenile court judge could
order the criminal prosecution of a child charged with a misdemeanor. McCallen v. State, 76 Tex.
Crim. 353, 174 S.W. 611 (1915); accord, Townser v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 4, 182 S.W. 1104
(1916).
71. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 3, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 6 (Supp.
1966).
72. 400 S.W.2d 552, 557-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (court affirmed conviction of child who
was under 16 at time of commission of offense):
House Bill 444, enacted at the last legislature, amending certain sections of Art.
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2338-1 V.C.S. (Acts 59th Leg. 1965, p. 1256, Ch. 577) was approved June 17, 1965.
It did not become effective until August 30, 1965, hence was not in effect at the time
this case was tried and decided in the trial court.
The provisions added to Art. 2338-I which concerned us to such extent that the
case was re-submitted and re-argued are those which might be construed as barring the
trial of any defendant as an adult under any conditions upon a showing that such
defendant was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed. If this be
so, the decisions of this Court in the cases above cited, as to such a defendant under
16 years of age at the time he committed the offense, have been overruled and neither
this nor any future conviction of such a defendant without regard to his age at the time
of his trial as an adult can stand.
One portion of Section 6 of Article 2338-I as amended by House Bill 444, Acts
59th Legislature 1965, p. 1256, Ch. 577, provides for the certification of a child 16
years of age or older by the Juvenile Court for criminal proceedings with the provision
that no child under 16 years of age at the time the offense is committed shall be so
certified.
The Caption of the Act gave notice that it was "providing for transfers of certain
cases in Juvenile Courts from the jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts to the jurisdiction of
the other courts in this State" and was "providing that certain delinquent children shall
be subject to the penal laws and criminal prosecution the same as if they were adults."
The above portion of amended Section 6 conforms to the purpose and intent of
the Legislature as expressed in the emergency clause: "The fact that the present law is
inadequate to curb juvenile delinquency in this State creates an emergency. * * *."
We find it difficult to understand the further provisions of Section 6 as amended
which reads:
"[A]nd no child under sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense
is committed shall be prosecuted as an adult at any later date unless
transferred by the Juvenile Court, and all such offenses committed by
children not so transferred shall be subject to disposition by the Juvenile
Court only."
If, under the rules of statutory construction, there is any way to construe these
provisions so as to conform to the notice in the Caption, and to the purpose and intent
of the Legislature as indicated by the Caption and the emergency clause, and leave a
statute that is not contradictory, vague and uncertain, we have been unable to find it.
The Caption gave notice to the Legislature and the public that House Bill 444
would provide that certain delinquent children shall be subject to the penal laws and
criminal prosecution the same as if they were adults, but no notice that the act would
provide that male defendants over 17 and females over 18 years of age would no longer
be subject to but would be exempt from such penal laws and criminal prosecution if
they were under 16 years of age at the time they committed the crime.
That portion of the amendment of Section 6 of Art. 2338-1 which provides "no
child under sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense was committed shall be
prosecuted as an adult at any later date unless transferred by the Juvenile Court, and
all such offenses committed by children not so transferred shall be subject to disposition
by the Juvenile Court only," is so indefinitely framed and of such doubtful construction
that it cannot be understood, either from the language in which it is expressed or from
some other written law of the state, and must be regarded as wholly inoperative. Art.
6 P.C.; Ex parte Marshall, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 83, 161 S.W. 112.
Under the holding of this Court in Ex parte Meyer, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 403, 357
S.W.2d 754, and cases cited, such portion of the statute is likewise invalid because the
Caption of the Act is misleading and fails to give notice that persons under 16 years
of age at the time the offense was committed were to be exempted from penal laws
and criminal prosecution.
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waiver authorization was demonstrated in Ex parte Miranda.3 On
December 15, 1965, Rodriguez and Miranda were arrested in
connection with an investigation of a murder which had occurred the
evening before. Petitions filed in juvenile court alleged that Rodriguez
and Miranda had committed sodomy on December 14 and that each
had committed a burglary almost a year before. On December 21,
1965, Rodriguez, 15 years, 11 months old, and Miranda, 16 years and
28 days old, were declared delinquent on the basis of the sodomy and
burglaries and delivered to Gatesville State School for Boys. On
January 24, 1967, after each had become 17, a bench warrant was
issued for their return to Hidalgo County on a charge of murder to
await the action of the grand jury. On their return they filed
applications for writs of habeas corpus, which were denied. On appeal,
the court of criminal appeals held that in regard to Rodriguez, who had
been under 16 at the time of the juvenile court hearing, the waiver
provision of juvenile court jurisdiction no longer applied. Since he was
now 17 he could be tried in criminal court for the murder. In regard
to Miranda, who had been 16 at the time of the juvenile court hearing,
the waiver provision did not require the juvenile court to hold a waiver
hearing. Therefore, he could be tried as a delinquent while 16 and then
tried as an adult when he became 17.14
In 1967 the transfer age was reduced from 16 to 15 and the
requirements for transfer were explicitly stated.7 5 However, certain
73. 415 S.W.2d 413 (lex. Crim. App. 1967). The court's discussion of section 6 was
dictum, since the appeal from the judgment remanding appellants to the custody of the sheriff
was dismissed because of the return of the indictment the day following the entry of notice of
appeal.
74. Broadway v. State, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), was a case of rape by a
16-year-old boy, certified to criminal court under the 1965 amendment to section 6.
75. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 4, codified as TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 6
(Supp. 1968), construed in In re Buchanan, 433 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968,
writ rerd n.r.e.):
(b) If a child is charged with the violation of a penal law of the grade of felony
and was fifteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, the juvenile court may, within a reasonable time after the alleged offense, waive
jurisdiction by following the requirements set out in Subsections (c) through (6) of this
section, and transfer the child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court
for criminal proceedings.
(c) The juvenile court shall conduct an informal hearing under Section 13 of this
Act on the issue of waiver of jurisdiction.
(d) Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court shall order and obtain a complete
diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his
circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.
(e) The juvenile court shall appoint counsel for any child who does not have
retained counsel, and shall allow counsel at least ten days to prepare for the hearing.
19701
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limitations were built into the system. For example, if the juvenile court
held a waiver hearing and the child appealed from the decision to
certify, the appeal would be dismissed as moot if at the time the appeal
was heard the child had become 17 if a boy or 18 if a girl.76 Thus the
The presence of counsel at the hearing may not be avoided or waived. Appointed
counsel is entitled to a fee for each day actually spent in court in the amount and from
the same source as specified in Article 26.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or
any future amendment of that article.
(f) The juvenile court shall give counsel access to all the records relating to the
child including the report of the investigation that must precede the hearing in the
possession of the court, its staff, or employees. The juvenile court may refuse to reveal
the source of any information if it finds that revelation would be injurious to the child
or would prejudice the future availability of similar information. If the court refuses
to reveal the source of any information and the child or his counsel objects to the
refusal, the court shall preserve the identity of the source and make it available to the
district or criminal district court if the child is transferred for criminal proceedings.
(g) After full investigation and hearing the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction
of the case unless it determines that, because of the seriousness of the offense or the
background of the offender, the welfare of the community requires criminal
proceedings.
(h) In making the determination under Subsection (g) of this section, the court
shall consider, among other matters:
(I) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater
weight in favor of waiver given to offenses against the person;
(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated
manner;
(3) whether there is evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return
an indictment;
(4) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(5) the record and previous history of the child;
(6) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the juvenile court.
(i) If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the child is not subject to prosecution
at any time for any offense alleged in the petition or for any offense within the
knowledge of the juvenile judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the
proceeding.
(j) If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction it shall certify its action, including the
written order and findings of the court and accompanied by a complaint against the
child, and transfer the child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court
for criminal proceedings. Upon transfer of the child for criminal proceedings he shall
be dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
transfer of custody is an arrest. However, the examining trial shall be conducted by
the district court or criminal district court which may remand the child to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
(k) If the child's case is brought to the attention of the grand jury and the grand
jury does not indict for the offense charged in the complaint forwarded by the juvenile
court, the district court or criminal district court shall certify the grand jury's failure
to indict to the juvenile court. Upon receipt of the certification the juvenile court may
resume jurisdiction of the child.
76. Dillard v. State, 439 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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child would be subject to the criminal court's jurisdiction, since age at
trial and not age at commission controls.
Once juvenile court jurisdiction has attached and the child has
been declared a delinquent, when may the court's order be modified or
revoked or juvenile court jurisdiction terminated? Before 1965 the child
would continue under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until he
became 21, unless discharged prior to becoming 21."1 A petition could
be filed with the juvenile court to modify or revoke an order of
commitment.
This was in no sense a collateral attack on the judgment. It was
a direct attack brought in the court in which the judgment was
rendered to "revoke or modify" the judgment. Moreover, being filed
and heard at the same term of court at which the judgment was
rendered, it may be regarded either as a motion for new trial (the
court having jurisdiction over the judgment during the term), or as
an independent proceeding to set the judgment aside. Here the
nomenclature is not of substantial importance."'
In 1965 the juvenile court lost some of its power to modify or revoke,
or terminate jurisdiction. Juvenile court jurisdiction continued until the
child was discharged by the court or until he became 21, but only in
those cases where he was not committed to the Texas Youth Council. 79
Once the juvenile court committed the child to the "control of the
agency of the state charged with the care, training, control of, or parole
of delinquent children," its jurisdiction over the child ended.
B. Juvenile Court Procedure
I. Before Hearing
The 1907 juvenile court act provided that juvenile court
proceedings were to be instituted by sworn complaint and information
filed by the county attorney. When an indictment for a felony was
77. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 5 (1964).
78. Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ) (no
motion for new trial or appeal taken within 5 days as provided by statute).
79. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 2, at 1257; Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 3, at 1083, codified
as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 5 (Supp. 1968), construed in Lee v. State, 425 S.W.2d
698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
80. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 3, at 138. Section 3 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 3 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2193 (1911), (1914), and
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1199 (191 I). The 1913 revision of the code, Tex. Laws 1913, ch.
112, § 5, at 215, left article 1199 intact. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1199 (1916), construed in Ex
parte Roach, 87 Tex. Crim. 370, 221 S.W. 975 (1920).
In 1909 the juvenile court act was amended so a parent or guaridan of an incorrigible boy
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dismissed from the docket of the district court and the case transferred
to the juvenile docket, it was necessary to file a complaint and
information against the juvenile. He could not be proceeded against as
a delinquent under the indictment.8' The complaint and information
had to set forth the acts of delinquency with sufficient certainty to
enable the accused to understand the charge. In most instances, the
mere recitation of the language of the statute was sufficient. Others,
such as incorrigibility, required a more detailed statement.8 2 The
information did not have to state that the act committed constituted
the accused a delinquent child.u The complaint and information were
could present a petition to the juvenile court to have the boy committed. No comparable provision
existed for incorrigible girls. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § I, at 101-03, amending Tex. Laws 1907,
ch. 65, § 9. Although this version of section 9 was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9
(Supp. 1910), it did not appear in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (1911). It did appear as TEx. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 1206 (1911 ). Except for raising the age to 17, Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § II, at 219, left
this code provision unchanged. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1206 (1916), construed in Exparte Davis,
85 Tex. Crim. 218, 211 S.W. 456 (1919).
81. Exparie Ramseur, 81 Tex. Crim. 413, 195 S.W. 864 (1917); accord, Brown v. State,
99 Tex. Crim. 70, 268 S.W. 460 (1925); Exparte Ellis, 82 Tex. Crim. 641, 200 S.W. 840 (1918);
Exparte Medrano, 81 Tex. Crim. 388, 195 S.W. 865 (1917).
82. Rose v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 316, 129 S.W.2d 639 (1939) (degree of specificity of the
specific crime); Moore v. State, III Tex. Crim. 461, 14 S.W.2d 1041 (1929) (allegation of
"incorrigible" without more was insufficient); Ex parte Douglas, 109 Tex. Crim. 463, 5 S.W.2d
153 (1928) ("then and there unlawfully loiter on the public streets and refuse to obey her parents"
could not be the basis of prosecution); Meggs v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 415, 276 S.W. 262 (1925)
("was then and there and is incorrigible" was insufficient but "did then and there habitually
wander about the streets of the city of Fort Worth, in the nighttime, without being on any business
or occupation" was sufficient); Ex parte Gordon, 89 Tex. Crim. 125, 232 S.W. 520 (1921)
(incorrigible insufficient); Ex parte Roach, 87 Tex. Crim. 370, 221 S.W. 975 (1920) (incorrigible
insufficient); Hogue v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 170, 220 S.W. 96 (1920) (incorrigible insufficient).
In Fleming v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 530, 278 S.W. 846 (1925), the charging part of the
information read:
* * * With force and arms did unlawfully hereto commit offenses enumerated
herein such as to constitute said Kermit Fleming a delinquent child. Said offenses
complained of are as follows: Did on or about 3d day of March, 1925, commit the
offense of burglary, by breaking into the hardware store of J. F. Henslee in Cooper,
Delta County, Tex. Did on or about 3d day of March, 1925, commit the offense of
theft over $50 by taking from the possession of J. F. Henslee, without the consent of
said J. F. Henslee, pistols of more than the value of $50. Did on or about 6th of March,
1925, commit the offense of robbery with firearms, by forcing one Alvin Taylor, by
threats of life, to deliver to him certain money to the amount of $3, contrary to the
form and statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity
of the state.
The court held that the motion to quash should have been sustained because in none of the
subdivisions of the information were there contained averments sufficient to charge the felony
named therein.
83. Davis v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 429, 21 S.W.2d 1068 (1929).
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fatally defective if they did not state that the accused was within the
juvenile court's age bracket."'
The 1925 Code of Criminal Procedure eliminated the prohibition
against proceeding against a delinquent under an indictment. The new
code provided that the juvenile could be proceeded against under an
information and complaint or under an indictment.u Proceedings based
on an information without a complaint or on a complaint without an
information were a nullity.86 Once the law was changed so that the
juvenile could be tried in juvenile court on an indictment transferred
84. In 1918, Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, ch. 26, § I, at 44, added a provision to TEX.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1916):
Any proceeding under this Act begun by information and sworn complaint which
states upon its face the age of the child as under seventeen years in the case of males
and under eighteen years in the case of females, shall not be regarded as charging such
child with a felony or a misdemeanor, but as a delinquent child, although such acts
would otherwise charge a felony or a misdemeanor ...
A motion to quash was the proper place for raising the failure to specify age. If the defendant
waited until after the judgment was rendered, it was too late. Ex parte Chandler, 99 Tex. Crim.
255, 268 S.W. 749 (1925) (original application for habeas corpus); Gordon v. State, 89 Tex. Crim.
59, 228 S.W. 1095 (1921) (motion in arrest of judgment).
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1085 (1925), (1936):
A proceeding against a delinquent child may be begun by an information based
upon a sworn complaint, each of which shall state in general terms that the acts alleged
constitute such child a delinquent child, and shall conform in other respects to the rules
governing prosecutions for misdemeanors begun by information and complaint. Any
proceeding so begun which states upon the face of the information that the age of the
child is under seventeen in the case of males and under eighteen years in the case of
females shall not be regarded as charging said child with a felony or a misdemeanor
but as a delinquent child, although such acts alleged would otherwise charge a felony
or a misdemeanor. If such pleading does not allege the age of the accused, then the
accused, his or her parent, guardian, attorney or next friend, may make and file an
affidavit at any time before announcement of ready setting up the age of the accused,
and on proof that such age is within the juvenile limits, the case shall be transferred to
the juvenile docket, or, if the court is not a juvenile court to the proper juvenile court,
entered on the juvenile docket and proceeded with against the accused as a delinquent
child upon the same information and complaint.
See Stewart v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 145, 8 S.W.2d 140 (1928).
With the enactment of a minimum age of 10, the complaint and information were insufficient
to confer active jurisdiction on the court and over the subject if it were not alleged that the child
was over 10. Barron v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 292, 152 S.W.2d 760 (1941); Beadles v. State, 139
Tex. Crim. I, 138 S.W.2d 809 (1940); Haywood v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 413, 136 S.W.2d 866
(1940); Rose v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 316, 129 S.W.2d 639 (1939).
85. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1084 (1925), (1936) (indictment) and 1085 (1925), (1936)
(information and complaint). See Osborne v. Brooks, 75 S.W.2d 963 (lex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1934, no writ).
86. Information without a complaint: Exparle Tomlin, 107 Tex. Crim. 643, 298 S.W. 902
(1927). Complaint without an information: Ex parte Boggs, 146 Tex. Crim. 86, 171 S.W.2d 879
(1943); Barron v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 292, 152 S.W.2d 760 (1941); Nunn v. State, 132 Tex.
Crim. 613, 106 S. W.2d 702 (1937).
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from criminal court, the court noted that since the indictment would
not have contained an allegation as to the accused's age the omission
would not make the indictment defective in juvenile court. 7 However,
with the enactment of a minimum age for juvenile court jurisdiction,
the indictment would have been defective had it not alleged that the
accused was above the minimum age of 10.8
In 1943 the procedure was changed so that the county attorney or
any attorney could prepare and file in the juvenile court a "petition"
alleging delinquency. No longer were the proceedings to be instituted
by information and complaint or indictment.8 9 The 1943 Revised Civil
Statutes expressly required the delinquency petition to allege briefly:
the facts which bring said child within the provisions of this Act, and
stating: (1) the name, age and residence of the child; the names and
residences, (2) of his parents, (3) of his legal guardian, if there be one;
(4) of the person or persons having custody or control of the child;
and (5) of the nearest known relative, if no parent or guardian can
be found. If any of the facts herein required are not known by the
petitioner, the petition shall so state. 0
In order for the petition to allege "briefly the.facts which bring said
child within the provisions of this Act," it is essential to state in the
petition that the child committed one of the seven acts enumerated in
the juvenile court act that would constitute delinquency. Failure to do
so renders the petition insufficient to charge a violation of the juvenile
delinquency act. Such was the case in Ballard v. State,9 in which the
87. Davis v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 429, 21 S.W.2d 1068 (1929); Stewart v. State, 110 Tex.
Crim. 145, 8 S.W.2d 140 (1928).
88. Haywood v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 413, 136 S.W.2d 866 (1940) (dictum).
89. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 7, at 314, codified as TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 7 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 7 (1964). Tex. Laws
1943, ch. 204, § 7-A, at 314-15, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 7-A (Supp.
1943), (1948), and TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 7-A (1964), established venue.
90. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 7, at 314, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 7 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 7 (1964), construed
in Hawkins v. State, 401 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ) (petition failed
to allege the names and residences of the child's parents or to state that these facts were
unknown); In re Fisher, 184 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, no writ).
91. 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, no writ). A similar problem occurred
in Ex parte Yelton, 298 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ); the girl was
charged with unlawfully wandering about the streets without being on any business or occupation,
against the peace and dignity of the state. Viall v. State, 423 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ) (petition alleged that each boy "habitually deported himself so
as to injure and endanger the morals of himselr'); Johnson v. State, 401 S.W.2d 298 (rex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1966, no writ) (petition alleged that the child had "habitually violated the penal
ordinances"); Carter v. State, 342 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ) (petition
alleged that "said child is a delinquent child under the law").
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petition charged that the child "injured public property, to-wit, a sewer
pipe belonging to the City of Rails, Texas" but did not charge that
this was done in violation of "any penal ordinance of a political
subdivision of this State," as was one of the seven enumerated
delinquent acts. Another case was Robinson v. State,9z in which the
petition read "that said child is a delinquent chi!d under the law: 5
cases of Arson, a violation of the Penal Law of the State of Texas, of
the grade of felony." The court of appeals sustained the exception that
contended that the petition was
indefinite and uncertain and so vague that it makes it impossible for
the defendant to properly prepare his defense, to-wit: That the names
of the owners of the property involved in the five charges of arson are
not given, that the time of the commission of the offenses is not
stated, nor is the location of the property set out, nor is the offense
of arson stated in a statutory manner.
Beginning with the 1907 juvenile court act, the notice provision
appeared directed at giving the parents notice that juvenile court
proceedings were to be held so that they would be responsible for the
child's presence in court. A parent's promise to have the child present
would alleviate the necessity of the child's incarceration prior to
hearing. 3 The courts, however, did not limit notice to the threat of
incarceration but instead considered notice to the child's parent or
guardian imperative in all situations so that the parent would have
adequate warning of the charge in order to prepare a defense. 4 No
provision existed for supplying the child with notice.
92. 204 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).
93. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 4, at 138. Section 4 was codified as TEX. REv. CIv. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 4 (Supp. 1908), and recodified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2194 (1911), and codified
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1911). This part of article 1200 was left intact by Tex. Laws
1913, ch. 112, § 6, at 215-16, and appeared as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1916), construed
in Ex parte Cain, 86 Tex. Crim. 509, 217 S.W. 386, 388 (1920). The notice and service
requirements of the 1925 code were the same as those appearing in the 1916 code. TEX. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 1087 (1925).
94. Exparte Webb, 109 Tex. Crim. 192, 3 S.W.2d 810 (1928); Exparte Tomlin, 107 Tex.
Crim. 643, 298 S.W. 902 (1927); Exparte Burkhart, 94 Tex. Crim. 583, 253 S.W. 259, 260 (1923)
(motion for rehearing); Exparte Gordon, 89 Tex. Crim. 125, 232 S.W. 520 (1921).
Saliz v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 278, 152 S.W.2d 367 (1941), held that verbal notice, as
opposed to written notice, was not reversible error when the object and purpose of the statute
were attained by the presence of the parent with the child at the trial.
The father was not required to have been notified of proceedings before the criminal court
judge to determine whether the accused was within the juvenile court age bracket. The notice
provision applied only to proceedings before the juvenile court. Singleton v. State, 104 Tex. Crim.
9, 282 S.W. 804 (1926).
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In 1943 a new summons and notice provision was enacted95 along
with instructions on service of the summons.96 Basically the act
required the service of notice or summons on the child's parents or his
guardian unless they "shall voluntarily appear." When the parents
received oral notification and attended the hearings, the statutory
requirement was satisfied '17 However, if the parents received merely a
95. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 8, at 315, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 8 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 8 (1964).
96. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 9, at 315, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 9 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 9 (1964). Tex. Laws
1943, ch. 204, § 10, at 315, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 10 (Supp. 1943),
(1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 10 (1964):
If any person summoned as herein provided shall, without reasonable cause, fail
to appear, he may be proceeded against for contempt of court. In case the summons
cannot be served, or the parties served fail to obey the same, or in any case when it
shall be made to appear to the Judge that the servicing will be ineffectual, or the welfare
of the child requires that he shall be brought forthwith into the custody of the court, a
warrant may be issued against the child himself.
97. In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ rerd n.r.e.);
Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, no writ); In re Fisher, 184
S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, no writ); see Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, no writ) (mother made complaint to probation department and
was present at each proceeding).
Hawkins v. State, 401 S.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ),
questioned who must be summoned:
We call attention to the fact that the term "parties hereinafter named," considered
in context with the further provisions of Sec. 8, is quite indefinite. If it were necessary
to a decision of this case, it would be difficult to determine whether the voluntary
appearance of the "person or persons who have the custody or control of the child"
alone would dispense with the necessity of a summons; or whether, in addition, the child
or the parent or guardian, must voluntarily appear.
In the absence of the voluntary appearance of the required parties, the section
requires the service of a summons on the person or persons having the "custody or
control" of the child. In addition, where such person is not the parent or guardian of
the child, "then the parent or guardian, or both, shall be notified of the pendency of
the case * * * by personal service before the hearing * * *.- This provision for notice
is vague and indefinite. Where there is a guardian, is it necessary to give notice to both
parents and the guardian, or to one parent and the guardian, or will notice to the
guardian alone, or the parents alone, be sufficient? How long before the hearing must
notice be given?
Apparently service of the summons at least two days before the time fixed in the
summons "for the return thereof" is jurisdictional. Sec. 9, however, provides that
"jurisdiction may be obtained by the court" if the court is satisfied that the parent,
guardian, or person having custody of the child cannot be located, but there is no
procedure provided for obtaining such jurisdiction. The necessity for securing
jurisdiction over the child is pointed up by the provisions relating thereto in Sections 5
and 7, Art. 2338-1, V.A.T.S.
In this case no summons was issued. Notice is not specifically required unless a
summons to produce the child is served on one other than the parent or guardian.
Notice was delivered to the father, but not to the mother. The hearing was held prior
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subpoena to appear "as witnesses for the state" and no grounds for
delinquency were set out, appearance did not satisfy notice.9 8 In 1967
several of these existing practices were changed by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault.9 Gault held that for notice
of the first hearing to comply with due process (1) the notice must be
in writing; (2) it must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled
court proceedings to afford reasonable opportunity to prepare an
appearance; and (3) it must set forth the alleged misconduct with
particularity.
The 1907 juvenile court act limited incarceration of children
pending juvenile court hearing to those cases where it was necessary to
insure the attendance of the child in court. The statute further provided
that if the child was incarcerated confinement should not be in any
compartment of a jail or lockup in which persons over 16 were being
detained.100 In 1913 the code of criminal procedure was amended to
increase the age for separate incarceration from 16 to 18 and to add a
provision which required counties with a population over 100,000 to
provide a suitable place for detention of these children.'10 In 1927 the
to the date set in the notice. The judgment does not recite jurisdictional facts, i.e.,
voluntary appearance or service of a summons. The hearing was had the day following
the date of the filing of the petition.
In the absence of a summons served on the father, named in the petition as having
the custody and control of the child, or on any other person, and in the absence of a
recitation of jurisdictional facts in the judgment, particularly in view of the fact that
the notice of the hearing delivered to the father recited that the case was to be heard
on the day after the day it was heard and judgment was entered, despite the fact that
no statement of facts is in this record, we hesitate to presume that the trial court had
jurisdiction by reason of the voluntary appearance of the parties.
These matters are noted, although not necessary to a decision in this case, for the
reason that remedial legislation appears to be necessary. It is most unfortunate that
doubt and uncertainty as to the procedure to be followed in the initiation and
processing of juvenile delinquency petitions necessarily remains.
98. Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).
99. 387 U.S. I, 33 (1967). The Court's decision on notice was expressly limited to the first
hearing. For a discussion of Gault and Texas law, see Billings, The New Juvenile Delinquent Law,
31 TEX. B.J. 203 (1968); McKay, Juvenile Law, 1969 A.D., 2 A.G., 32 TEx. B.J. 291 (1969);
Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, 22 Sw. L.J. 211, 214-15 (1968); Comment, Application of
Gault: Its Effect on Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in Texas, 20 BAYLOR L. Rav. 113 (1967).
100. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 4, at 138-39. Section 4 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. tit. 33b, § 4 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2194 (1911), (1914),
and as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1911). This provision pertained to incarceration pending
juvenile court and not criminal court hearing. Ex parte Thomas, 56 Tex. Crim. 66, 118 S.W.
1053 (1909).
101. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 6, at 215-16, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200
(1911). TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1911), as amended in 1913, was codified as TEX. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1916). A similar provision was adopted in 1925. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art.
1087 (1925).
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legislature, expressing concern that in many counties delinquent
children frequently were placed in the same jail and often in the same
cell with a habitual criminal, lowered the size of the county in which a
separate jail or lockup was required from over 100,000 to over
50,000.102 The 1943 Revised Civil Statutes provided for custody of the
child pending hearing0 3 and specified proper places of detention. 04
Beginning in 1907, juvenile court legislation gave the incarcerated
child the right to give bail. 05 During the period when the proceedings
in juvenile court were criminal in nature, the rules of criminal
procedure applied to the right to reasonable bail pending appeal.'"
When the juvenile court became civil in nature the court discarded the
criminal concept of bail. As a result the right to bail pending appeal
became discretionary. 07
2. The Hearing
a. The Closed Hearing
The closed hearing came with the 1943 juvenile court act:
The Act does not require the trial court to conduct the
102. Tex. Laws 1927, ch. 163, § 1, at 236-37, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1087
(1925). Cf Continental Cas. Co. v. Miller, 135 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, no
writ) (action for damages for unlawful arrest and imprisonment) (law of arrest for adults also
applies to juveniles).
103. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 1I, at 315-16, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-
1, § I1 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § I1 (1964). In
Mendoza v. Baker, 319 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ), the court of civil
appeals held that an order from the juvenile court, directing that the child be placed in custody
of the supervisor of the juvenile detention home until a final hearing on the delinquency petition,
and an order of the juvenile court, refusing to grant the child a writ of habeas corpus releasing
him from the supervisor's custody, were temporary orders from which appeals could not be taken
to the court of civil appeals.
104. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 17, at 317-18, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-
1, § 17 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 17 (1964). In 1965
section 17 was amended to exclude those children transferred to criminal court under section 6.
Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 7, codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art 2338-1, § 17 (Supp. 1966).
105. Tex. Laws 1907, ch.,65, § 4, at 139. Section 4 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 4 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 2194 (1911), (1914) and
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1911). This phrase was left intact by Tex. Laws 1913, ch.
112, § 6, at 215, which amended article 1200 and later was recodified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
arts. 1200 (1916) and 1087 (1925), (1936). Cf Exparte Enderli, 110 Tex. Crim. 629, 10 S.W.2d
543 (1928) (murder by male under 17 was per se bailable).
106. Exparte Osborne, 127 Tex. Crim. 453, 75 S.W.2d 265 (1934).
107. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945). The language treating the
matter of bond in delinquency proceedings appeared in Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 21, codified
as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 21 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2338-1, § 21 (1964). For a discussion of discretionary bond, see Ex parte Rheude, 163 Tex.
Crim. 39, 289 S.W.2d 239 (1956) (court of criminal appeals refused to consider the matter on
the ground that it was a problem for the civil courts); Thomasson v. State, 269 S.W.2d 956
(1954), rev'd on other grounds, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955).
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proceedings in such cases behind closed doors and in chambers. It
does authorize the trial court to exclude the general public from the
hearing of any case if he thinks proper. This is done for the protection
of the child and to keep him from being subjected to publicity and
possible public ridicule that may have a tendency to destroy his
morale and make him worse rather than better. It seems that it will
be for the best interests of the child and for the general public that
such cases be not publicized. Most parents would not complain at the
trial court for excluding the general public from attending such a
hearing but would prefer that such be done. We think such a provision
is wisely given for the protection of the child if and when the trial
court thinks it is proper to exercise such discretion. It is our opinion
that this Act was passed making the juvenile court an agency to
safeguard the child who, because of the neglect or lack of interest of
others, has become a "problem child" and a potential criminal. This
Act affords the juvenile court an opportunity to counsel with such a
child, give him the proper guidance for good citizenship, counteract
any demoralizing influences that may have been leading him astray,
and to substitute the court as far as he can for parental supervision
in wisely directing the energies of the child. Such can be done best
by ascertaining a history of the case, winning the confidence of the
child and proving an interest manifestly in his well being. Parents do
not attempt such discipline of their children before the general public
and it stands to reason that there are times when a juvenile court
would consider it for the best interest of the child and society to
exclude the general public when he resorts to such methods of
discipline. It is our opinion that such a provision in said Act does not
contravene either the State or Federal Constitution.1 08
b. Consolidation of Two Cases for Trial in One Hearing
The first question concerning consolidation arose immediately
after enactment of the 1943 juvenile court act. The court in In re Dendy
held:
The Act makes no provision for consolidating for trial by the
108. In re Dendy, 175 S.W.2d 297, 302-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943). The court of
appeals concluded that the trial court did not commit error in excluding the general public from
the hearing in this case since the record failed to show that the exclusion resulted in any harm.
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals position.
The law also authorizes the trial court to exclude the general public from a hearing of
any case, if it thinks proper to do so. This saves the minor from embarrassment, and
also permits the court to avoid the publicity that often surrounds the trial of a case.
Since the proceedings under this Act must be governed largely by rules governing civil
actions, the trial court did not err in excluding the general public from the trial. Dendy
v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944).
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trial court of two or more such cases; neither does it prohibit such.
Since the trial court is given much discretion in procedure in all cases
involving the rights and future destinies of minor children and since
the instant cases were parallel cases that grew out of the same
transaction and since the record does not disclose any injustice or
harm done to either child, we believe the trial court did not abuse his
discretion in consolidating the two cases and trying them together and
that no error was committed by so doing.'"
c. Right to Counsel and Guardian ad Litem
Beginning with the 1907 juvenile court act, the juvenile court was
authorized to appoint counsel to appear and defend on behalf of the
child." 0 If counsel was waived, the probation officer was authorized to
represent the interests of the child when the case was heard.", The early
cases held that the court was not required to inform the juvenile and
his parents that he was entitled to be represented by counsel." 2
Gault changed the practice for notification of right to counsel.
Now, under Gault, it is necessary to notify the child and his parents
that the child has a right to be represented by counsel retained by them
or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed
to represent the child." 3 The counsel aspect of Gault had retroactive
effect. In Gutierrez v. State ex rel. Wichita County"' the child, without
being informed of his right to counsel, was adjudged a delinquent in
1963 and placed on probation. In 1968 the child, now represented by
counsel, was charged with breach of his probation terms. The juvenile
court revoked the prior probation order and committed the juvenile to
109. 175 S.W.2d 297, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943), affd sub nom. Dendy v.
Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944).
110. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 4, at 139, codified as TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 4
(Supp. 1908), TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2194 (1911), (1914), and TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200
(1911). This part of article 1200 was left intact by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 6, at 216, and
appeared as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1200 (1916), construed in Exparte Gordon, 89 Tex. Crim.
125, 232 S.W. 520 (1921). The 1925 and 1936 codes, like the 1916 code, authorized the juvenile
court to appoint counsel to defend the child. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1087 (1925), (1936).
I11. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 6, at 139, codified as TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 6
(Supp. 1908), and recodified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2196 (1911), (1914), and as TEx. CODE
CaiM. P. art. 1202 (1911). For a discussion on the advice of the probation or juvenile officer to
the parents on employment of counsel, see Noble v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 162, 61 S.W.2d 494
(1933); In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 855-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ rerd n.r.e.).
112. Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, no writ); cf.
Hegwood v. Kindrick, 264 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Roberts v. Beto, 245 F. Supp. 235
(S.D. Tex. 1965); Dudley v. State, 219 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ ref'd).
113. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ.
App. -Houston 1968, no writ).
114. 433 S.W.2d 777, 779 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ).
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the custody of the Texas Youth Council. The court of appeals
remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings
consistent with the principles set out in Gault:
Under the law pronounced in Gault which we must and do.
follow, we declare the 1963 decree invalid. It follows that the court
in 1968 had no authority to commit appellant to the Youth Council
on an order based on said decree.
In re Gonzalez" 5 was the first case to raise the issue of guardian
ad litem. Here the child alleged that the juvenile court committed error
in failing to appoint for him a guardian ad litem. The court of appeals
responded that there was no requirement of this nature in the pertinent
statutes and added that it must be remembered that the child's parents
had been present at the hearing and trial. The point was therefore
overruled. Lee v. McKay"' limited the Gonzalez opinion to cases where
the parent or guardian is present.
d. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
During the pre-1943 period, the criminal rules pertaining to self-
incrimination applied." 7 When the procedure was changed to follow
civil procedure "as far as practicable," it was not long before the
question was raised whether the juvenile court had the power to compel
minors to testify against themselves. In In re Dendy the court of
appeals held that there still existed a privilege against self-
incrimination:
[T]here are certain fundamental basic principles of law that men have
recognized and observed since time immemorial and our American
jurisprudence has followed many such principles and rules of law. One
of these rules is that the accused is entitled to have a trial by an
impartial jury, if he demands such, and another is that the accused
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself. Numerous
authorities hold that a witness cannot be compelled to give evidence
115. 328 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. 414 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ dism'd); accord, Yzaguirre
v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ). But see Starks v. State,
449 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
117. Miller v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 417, 21 S.W.2d 304 (1929). The statement did not
show that the accused had been warned by the person to whom the confession was made, that
she did not have to make any statement at all, nor did it show that she was advised that any
statement made by her might be used in evidence against her on her trial for the offense
concerning which the confession was made. See Saliz v. State, -142 Tex. Crim. 278, 152 S.W.2d
367 (1941) (use of confession in misdemeanor cases).
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that will tend either directly or indirectly to incriminate himself,
whether the case be civil or criminal. . . .Both the New Century
Dictionary and Webster's New International Dictionary define the
word "incriminate" as follows: "to charge with a crime or fraud; to
accuse, or to involve in an accusation." According to these
authorities, it would be error to compel an accused juvenile to give
evidence against himself whether the procedure be criminal or civil.
The Act does not require an accused child in such a procedure
to testify .against himself in such a case and nowhere does the Act
require the trial court to follow civil procedure in taking testimony
in such cases. We, therefore, believe the trial court committed error
in requiring Billy Dendy and L.J. King, Jr. to give evidence, over their
objections, against themselves."'
When Dendy was appealed, the supreme court further developed the
privilege against self-incrimination. Since at that time the child could
be proceeded against for the same offense in criminal court, the
privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the civil
proceedings."9 The juvenile had no concomitant right before testifying
to be warned by the juvenile court of his privilege.1'0
With the advent of Gault, the child became entitled to a warning.
Appellee has confessed error to the extent of admitting that the
record of this case does not clearly show at what time during the
118. 175 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943).
119. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); see In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d
844, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ refd n.r.e.); Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329, 331
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, no writ). In Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1947, no writ), a nonjury case,
The second and third assignments complain of the admission in evidence of a
written confession of the defendant, over the objections, in substance, that: It was not
free and voluntary; he was only 12 years old; was in jail at the time; was brought direct
from the jail to the county attorney's office; he was not advised that he had a right to
be represented by an attorney, and was not so represented. The officers who took the
confession testified to its voluntary character, that defendant was warned that anything
he might say would be used against him. He was not, however, advised that he had
the right to legal counsel, and in fact did not have the advice of such counsel. In the
brief, under the assignments, it is urged that he was at the time under illegal arrest, in
that various formalities prescribed by Art. 2338-1, Sec. 11, were not complied with.
This being a civil proceeding, it was immaterial whether he was under arrest, legal or
illegal, at the time the confession was made. While there was some evidence that
coercion or intimidation was used in its procurement; such evidence was sufficient only
to raise a fact question on that issue. The evidence was clearly sufficient to warrant
admission of the confession, even in a criminal proceeding. It was clearly admissible
in a civil case.
120. Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, no writ).
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interrogation of Gary Wayne Choate he was given such warnings by
Officer Turner so as to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
privilege to remain silent.
Inculpatory admissions made prior to a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination are not admissible. Miranda v. State of
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Appellee's brief shows that appellee recognizes that by In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court has made applicable to juveniles the privilege against
self-incrimination as it was applied to adults in Miranda v. Arizona,
supra.
The same privilege arises in connection with both the signed
statement and the search of appellants' home.
As this case was developed in the trial court the written statement
of Gary Wayne Choate, which was admitted in evidence over
appellants' objection, was crucial in establishing the State's position.
In accordance with Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the
judgment of the Trial Court is reversed and remanded.'
If the case is before a judge without a jury, then even an inadmissible
confession received into evidence is not necessarily prejudicial error.
There is a presumption in a nonjury trial that the trial court did not
consider the inadmissible evidence. Without this presumption, the
positive declaration by the trial judge that he did not consider the
statement would make the admission of improper evidence harmless
where therewas sufficient proper evidence on which to base the
decision.' An admission of an improper confession in a jury trial
could not be harmless. 2 3
e. Confrontation and Cross- Examination
The use of civil procedure raised the question whether there existed
the right to hear evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. Gault held
that
absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an
order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the
121. Choate v. State, 425 S.W.2d 706-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ); accord,
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 (1967).
122. Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ).
This case also discusses when a confession would be inadmissible under Miranda and Gault.
123. Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ); cf. Roberts
v. Beto, 245 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (voluntary confession based on totality-of-
circumstances doctrine enunciated in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)); In re Garcia,
443 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ) (voluntary confession).
1970]
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absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-
examination in accordance with our law and constitutional
requirements .
24
Intertwined with the right to hear evidence was the question of the
scope of evidence admitted for the court's consideration. Should the
court admit hearsay evidence or extraneous material not charged in the
petition? These questions were raised and decided in Ballard v. State:' "
Appellants further complain that the trial court heard and
considered evidence concerning extraneous matters and other alleged
misconduct of the child not alleged in the petition and that hearsay
evidence and statements made out of the presence and hearing of
appellants were considered by the trial court in arriving at its findings
in support of the judgment rendered. It is agreed by stipulation and
the trial court states that he, in pronouncing sentence on the child and
rendering judgment in the case, heard and considered statements made
to him out of the presence and hearing of appellants and that such
statements were not made at the trial. Particularly, did the trial court
admit hearing such statements made by the child's school teacher
about its being absent from school and its attitude in school. The
statement of facts reflects that hearsay testimony, appearing to us to
be material, was heard by the trial court and that testimony
concerning extraneous matters not alleged in the petition was heard
on the trial. Particularly was evidence heard about the child being
absent from school at different times without the consent of its
parents and about the child being suspected of having committed
other offenses.
The accused in such cases should be faced by the witnesses who
gave evidence against him and should be permitted to hear such
evidence and have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The
evidence given in such cases should also be confined to the charges
alleged in the petition filed in the case. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that the trial court erred in considering statements of a
material nature made to him out of the presence and hearing of
appellants. It was likewise error for the trial court to hear and
consider hearsay. evidence of a material nature and to hear and
consider evidence about extraneous matters and misconduct of the
child with which it was not charged in the petition presented in the
case.
124. in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57 (1967).
125. 192 S.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, no writ).
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The decision as to the prejudicial nature of the evidence is based on
whether the trial court considered the statements made to it.
The rule in respect to admitting inadmissible evidence in the trial
of a case in which there is no jury is that if there is sufficient evidence
to support the court's judgment without the aid of such inadmissible
testimony, unless the contrary is shown, it will be presumed that the
court disregarded the same in rendering its judgment. 26
Arguments to the jury also were subject to scrutiny. For instance,
the county attorney could not tell the jury: "If the defendant's attorney
hadn't objected so much and the court hadn't sustained him in his
objections, I would have proved a whole lot more on this boy than I
have."127
The problem is somewhat different if the hearing is not the
original hearing on whether the child is a delinquent but is a subsequent
hearing on whether the original disposition order of the court should
be changed.
The hearing was had to determine whether or not the child had
violated its parole and to determine what was for the child's best
interest in the future. The Juvenile Act gives the court much discretion
in conducting such a hearing and specifically provides that "The
Judge may conduct the hearing in an informal manner." In this
hearing the pleadings authorized much latitude at the hearing;
however, it has been held that a court may conduct a hearing such
as this without pleadings. . . .It has likewise been often held that the
trial court is not limited to the ordinary rules of pleading in a hearing
pertaining to the custody of a minor child. . . .The record reveals
that the trial court excluded from consideration at the hearing all
hearsay testimony. If such had not been excluded it is presumed that
the trial court did not consider any improper evidence heard. . . .We
overrule appellants' points of error complaining that improper
evidence was heard and considered by the trial court.'2
126. In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.c.);
accord, Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, no writ); see
Gamble v. State, 405 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, no writ).
In Williams, a nonjury case, the court held that where there was no showing that the juvenile
court considered any evidence on extraneous matters in committing the child, the appellate court
would presume that the juvenile court judge did not consider this evidence. See In re Brown, 201
S.W.2d 844, 847-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.c.) (evidence needed for
disposition).
127. Stallings v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 300, 87 S.W.2d 255 (1935).
128. In re Hoskins, 198 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex. Civ. App. -Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
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f Right to Trial by Jury
The 1907 juvenile court act authorized any interested person to
demand a jury trial, or the judge on his own motion to order a jury
trial. This provision was codified in both the revised civil statutes and
the code of criminal procedure.'2 In 1913 the judge's authority to order
a-jury trial on his own motion was deleted from the code but not from
the revised statutes.130 In 1909 a second jury provision made a brief
appearance in both the civil statutes and the code. It required the
juvenile court judge to have a jury summoned, unless waived, in felony
cases transferred from the district to the juvenile court. This provision
disappeared from the civil statutes in 1911 and was repealed from the
code in 1913.13 Although the 1925 code did not include a provision
authorizing any interested person to demand a jury trial, several
provisions discuss the duties of the jury. From these, it could be
concluded that the right to demand a jury remained intact . 32 The 1943
statute was more explicit in authorizing a jury.133 However, the right
could be lost if a jury were not demanded in the manner required by
the rules of civil procedure. 34
129. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 2, at 138. Section 2 was codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 2 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2192 (1911), (1914), and
as TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1198 (1911).
130. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 4, at 215, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1198 (1911).
TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1198 (1911), as amended in 1913, was codified as TEX. CODE CRiM. P.
art. 1198 (1916), construed in Exparte Gordon, 89 Tex. Crim. 125, 232 S.W. 520 (1921). No
change was made in the civil statutes. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2192 (1914).
- 131. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § 1, at 101-03, amended Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9. The
amended version of section 9 was codified as TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1910)
but did not appear in either TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. art. 2199 (1911) or TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art.
2200 (1911), the recodifications of section 9. This provision did appear as TEx. CODE CRiM. P.
art. 1205 (1911) but was repealed by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 13, at 220.
132. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1089 (1925), (1936) (verdict and judgment), 1090 (1925),
(1936) (term of commitment), and 1091 (1925), (1936) (substitution of place of confinement).
133. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 13, at 316-17, codified as TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. art. 2338-
1, § 13 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964), (1948),
and TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964). Section 13 was amended in 1965 by
Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 5, codified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1966),
and in 1967 by Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 6, codified as TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13
(Supp. 1968).
134. In re Dendy, 175 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943), held that the
rules of civil procedure need not be followed in demanding a jury.
The Act in question provides for a jury trial when a jury is demanded and
authorizes the trial court to order a jury on his own motion in such cases. Nowhere
does the Act provide for the payment of a jury fee and nowhere does it require the trial
court to follow civil procedure in demanding and impanelling a jury if and when a jury
is demanded in such cases. Therefore, we believe the trial court committed error in
denying Billy Dendy and L. J. King, Jr., a trial by an impartial jury.
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Prior to 1943, if the trial was by jury, then the jury would decide
both guilt and assessment of punishment. Failure to assess punishment
was fatal error.'35 This was changed in 1943 when the jury was
authorized to state only whether the child was delinquent. Disposition
was then for the court.t36
The right to a jury trial applied only to the original hearing on
whether the child was a delinquent. It did not extend to subsequent
hearings concerning change in custody.
Under the provisions of the Act the question of modifying or revoking
former orders entered in a juvenile case is discretionary with the trial
court and upon proper notice it is wholly within the sound discretion
of the trial court to determine whether or not it will be for the best
interest of the child to commit it to the custody of an institution. It
was therefore not error for the trial court to refuse a request for a
jury in the hearing and appellants' complaint about such refusal is
therefore overruled.1
37
The trial court had no obligation to advise the juvenile of his right to
jury trial. lu
g. Insanity and Infancy Defenses to Prosecution
In Texas insanity has been held to be a defense in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding. 39 Thus a guilty mind is required for a child
to be a delinquent just as a guilty mind is required for an adult to be
a criminal.
On appeal to the supreme court, Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944),
the court of appeals was ruled in error.
This law provides for a trial by jury, and a person tried thereunder is entitled to a
jury if properly demanded. No jury was properly demanded in this insta,"'f and under
the facts the trial court did not err in proceeding with the trial without a ju: ,.
Accord, In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see In re Hu -k-. '8 S.W.2d
460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, writ rerd n.r.e.).
135. Ex parte Pruitt, 82 Tex. Crim. 394, 200 S.W. 392 (1917). TEX. CODE CR,". P. art.
1089 (1925), (1936).
136. In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 13, at 316-17, codified as TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13
(Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964). Section 13 was
amended in 1965 by Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 5, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-
i, § 13 (Supp. 1966), and in 1967 by Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 6, codified as TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1968).
137. In re Hoskins, 198 S.W.2d 460,464 (rex. Civ. App. -Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ)
(criminal procedure for jury waiver inapplicable); Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ.
App. -Dallas 1950, no writ).
139. State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ rerd n.r.e.)
(murder).
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With the enactment of special legislation applicable solely to
juveniles, the infancy defense which had begun as a defense to criminal
prosecution now was applied to cases on the juvenile docket. 40 The
defense remained unchanged from what it had been prior to the juvenile
court act. The presumption of incapacity was irrebuttable for children
under 9 and rebuttable for children between 9 and 13."' The state still
carried the burden of showing that the child between 9 and 13 had
sufficient discretion to understand the nature and illegality of the act
constituting the offense." 2 Prior to the establishment of the minimum
age of 10 for delinquency proceedings, the effect of applying this
defense to cases on the juvenile docket was to place a minimum age of
9 on juvenile court proceedings.
The 1943 juvenile court act did not repeal by implication the
criminal incapacity provisions found in the penal code." 3 However,
changing the procedure from criminal to civil did play havoc with the
140. Delinquency proceedings: Purvis v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 441, 112 S.W.2d 186 (1938);
Howard v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 585, 298 S.W. 587 (1927); Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495,
200 S.W. 389 (1918); Windham v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. 664, 150 S.W. 613 (1912).
141. The criminal incapacity provision, TEx. PEN. CODE art. 34 (1911), became TEx. PEN.
CODE art. 30 (1925) and TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 30 (1952). The capital punishment provision,
TEx. PEN. CODE art. 35 (1911), construed in Flores v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 506, 231 S.W. 786
(1921); Williams v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 2.37, 177 S.W. 965 (1915); Munger v. State, 57 Tex.
Crim. 384, 122 S.W. 874 (1909), became TEX. PEN. CODE art. 31 (1925) and TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 31 (1952), and was shortened to read:
A person for an offense committed before he arrived at the age of seventeen years shall
in no case be punished with death.
This new provision was applied in Ex parte Adams, 383 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)
(waiver of jury in murder case because not capital when committed by one 17); Hultin v. State,
171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961); Hall v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 573, 301 S.W.2d 161,
165-66 (1957) (motion for rehearing) (physical age rather than mental age controls); Northern v.
State, 152 Tex. Crim. 569, 216 S.W.2d 192 (1949).
In addition, there still remained offenses that could be committed only by a person who had
attained 21: White v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 147, 151 S.W. 826 (1912) (aggravated assault on a
female); contra, Hand v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 422, 227 S.W. 194 (1921) (aggravated assault);
Stracner v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 89, 215 S.W. 305 (1919) (seduction). For a discussion of the
principal-accomplice problem, see Smith v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 15, 237 S.W. 265 (1921).
142. Juvenile court cases: Purvis v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 441, 112 S.W.2d 186 (1938);
Howard v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 585, 298 S.W. 587 (1927).
Criminal court cases: Real v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 178, 103 S.W.2d 741 (1937) (murder
conviction of 9-year-old); Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389, 392 (1918) (motion
for rehearing); Scott v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. 41, 158 S.W. 814 (1913); Windham v. State, 67
Tex. Crim. 664, 150 S.W. 613 (1912); Pyron v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 639, 138 S.W. 705 (1911);
Ragdale v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 145, 134 S.W. 234 (1911).
The perjury exception for children was retained: Flannery v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 235, 117
S.W.2d I11 (1938) (9-year-old witness in rape case); Smith v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 273, 164
S.W. 838 (1914) (no error in permitting 5-year-old to testify in rape case); Munger v. State, 57
Tex. Crim. 384, 122 S.W. 874 (1909) (no error in permitting 7-year-old to testify in rape case).
143. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 276 (1944).
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use of children 10 or older as witnesses in criminal cases, because they
could not be punished for perjury. In Santillian v. State" the court of
criminal appeals was forced to choose between permitting a child to
testify or upholding the juvenile court act, which stated that no male
child between 10 and 17 and no female child between 10 and 18 shall
be "charged with or convicted of crime in any court." The court, in
permitting the child to be a witness, held the latter phrase in violation
of article 1, section 5, of the Texas Constitution and the equal
protection provision in the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution.4 5 For witnesses under 10 this problem did not arise
because they were not subject to the juvenile court act. 46 In 1967 the
criminal incapacity statute was amended to read:
Section 1. No person may be convicted of any offense, except
perjury, which was committed before he was 15 years of age; and for
perjury only when it appears by proof that he had sufficient discretion
to understand the nature and obligation of an oath.
Sec. 2. No male under 17 years of age and no female under 18
years of age may be convicted of an offense except perjury unless the
juvenile court waives jurisdiction and certifies the person for criminal
proceedings.'47
This would appear to eliminate infancy as a defense to juvenile court
proceedings.
h. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Burden of Proof
Delinquency proceedings, like other types of proceedings, required
proof of the allegation in the complaint. Failure to prove the charges
resulted in reversal for insufficiency of the evidence.'" However, when
144. 147 Tex. Crim. 554, 182 S.W.2d 812 (1944).
145. Santillian v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 554, 182 S.W.2d 812 (1944) (motion for rehearing)
(15-year-old boy proper witness in marijuana case); accord, Slusser v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 160,
232 S.W.2d 727 (1950) (motion for rehearing) (10-year-old boy proper witness in sodomy case);
Head v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 594, 183 S.W.2d 570 (1944) (1 I-year-old boy proper witness in
sodomy case); Fields v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 540, 182 S.W.2d 815 (1944) (13-year-old girl proper
witness in rape case).
146. Head v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 594, 183 S.W.2d 570 (1944) (8-year-old boy proper
witness in sodomy case).
147. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 7, at 1086, codified as TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 30
(Supp. 1968).
148. Moore v. State, Ill Tex. Crim. 461, 14 S.W.2d 1041 (1929) (habitually wandered
about the streets in the nighttime without being on any business or occupation); Meggs v. State,
101 Tex. Crim. 415, 276 S.W. 262 (1925) (single or occasional acts do not constitute sufficient
evidence that accused "habitually" roamed the streets at night); De La 0 v. State, 94 Tex. Crim.
204, 250 S.W. 182 (1923); Woods v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 200, 225 S.W. 517 (1921) (state did
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the indictment or information charged a specific penal law violation,
the evidence was not insufficient if the facts would have supported the
conclusion of guilt of a violation of a lesser included offense. For
example, in Morgan v. State the accused, age 14, was tried before a
jury in a delinquency proceeding on an indictment that charged assault
with intent to murder. The juvenile contended that the evidence was
insufficient to show a specific intent to kill the party assaulted. The
court of criminal appeals held:
It would appear to be immaterial to ascertain whether the jury
intended to find the appellant guilty of an assault with intent to
murder, or of an aggravated assault, or of simple assault. Under the
indictment, he might be convicted as a delinquent, if found guilty of
any of the above offenses. If the jury found him guilty of the lowest
grade of assault, they would have the right under the statute to
adjudge him a delinquent and to punish him by confining him in the
boys' training school at Gatesville for a term longer than that given
to this appellant, in their discretion.
An examination of the facts in the instant case leads us to
conclude that the jury were justified in accepting the state's testimony
and finding that appellant made an assault upon the alleged injured
party with a knife. This being true, we are unable to agree with
appellant's contention that the evidence does not justify the
conviction.' 4'
With the 1943 change in the procedure from criminal to civil, the
state had to prove the acts alleged in the petition.1 0 New problems of
sufficiency of the evidence arose. For example, in making a motion for
directed verdict the rules of civil procedure were to be followed.
Passing on to the question whether the objections urged in the
not prove that Woods was in fact the boy who burglarized the store); Simpson v. State, 87 Tex.
Crim. 227, 220 S.W. 777 (1920); Guerrero v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 260, 220 S.W. 1095 (1920).
For a discussion of the denial of due process in a delinquency proceeding where the hearing
lasted no longer than 5 minutes, and no witnesses testified, other than the county juvenile officer,
and none of the allegedly stolen items was produced in court, see Hegwood v. Kindrick, 264 F.
Supp. 720 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
149. Morgan v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. 434, 25 S.W.2d 842, 843 (1930); accord, Davis v.
,,State, 113 Tex. Crim. 429, 21 S.W.2d 1068 (1929) (information charged aggravated
assault-evidence sufficient for simple assault).
150. Osborne v. State, 343 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ) (evidence
insufficient to establish the fact that sexual intercourse was by reason of the promise to marry);
Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ) (evidence
insufficient to establish the fact that sexual intercourse was by reason of the promise to marry);
Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ); In re Fisher, 184 S.W.2d
519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, no writ).
[Vol. 1:209250
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instant case met the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure, we
agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the basis of the objections
was not sufficiently specific. It will be noted that there are two
elements, both of which must be present, which are necessary before
a person is a delinquent child. First, he or she must be within the age
limits set by Section 3 of the Act, and second, he or she must have
committed one of the enumerated acts. The objections leveled in this
case could as well have been taken to mean that the evidence did not
show that the defendants had committed the act upon which the
delinquency was based.
Rule 268 provides: "A motion for directed verdict shall state the
specific grounds therefor." Rule 322 provides in part: "Grounds of
objections couched in general terms-as that * * * the verdict of the
jury is contrary to law, and the like-shall not be considered by the
court." We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that these Rules
were not complied with in this case.'
5
'
In establishing whether the judgment is supported by sufficient
evidence, the shift from criminal to civil procedure changed the degree
of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to a preponderance of the
evidence. Since the conduct that constituted delinquency was criminal,
how should the state prove the elements of the offense in a civil
proceeding?
It is true that in a proceeding of this kind the State should not
be held to the same strict technical proof that is required for a
conviction of a felony in a criminal case, but certainly it must be
shown that the crime charged has been committed in all of its
elements. 52
Discussion began in 1968 on whether the burden of proof should be
151. Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458, 459-60 (1944), reversing on other grounds
180 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1944).
152. Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ).
The court continued: "The yielding of the female by means of an unconditional promise of
marriage upon which she relies, is the very gist of the offense of seduction, and unless this fact is
established by the evidence there is no seduction."
In Thomasson v. State, 269 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954), the court of
civil appeals held that where there was no evidence that the acquisition of property in the manner
described in the petitions constituted robbery in the sister state of Arkansas, the adjudication of
delinquency for bringing this property into Texas was improper. The Texas Supreme Court
reversed. Thomasson v. State, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1955):
It is a well established rule of civil procedure that in the absence of proof to the
contrary the law of a sister state is presumed to be the same as that of the State of
Texas. . . . It would therefore be presumed that robbery with force and violence is a
felony in the State of Arkansas as it is in Texas.
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beyond a reasonable doubt instead of preponderance of the evidence.",
This culminated in Santana v. State in which the juvenile court held
the burden of proof was the preponderance of the evidence, the court
of civil appeals reversed holding that it was beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the Texas Supreme Court reversed thus going back to the
preponderance of the evidence. 54 While a petition for certiorari in
Santana was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the
Court, in the New York case of In re Winship required application of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to juvenile court adjudication
hearings when the delinquency was predicated on conduct that would
have been criminal had it been committed by an adult. 5
Using preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof
reduces the need for corroborating proof of the commission of the
crime. For example, the rule in criminal cases was that a confession
of arson was insufficient to support a conviction, unless there was
corroborating proof of the commission of the crime. Yet in Robinson
v. State the court said:
In this State the rule in civil cases is that it is only necessary to
establish the material allegations of the petition by a preponderance
of the evidence, even though the cause of action sued upon requires
proof of the commission of a crime. . . . The confession being
voluntary,and being sufficient in itself as an admission against
153. Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ)
(concurring opinion) (contention that child is denied due process and equal protection with
preponderance of evidence), noted in 22 Sw. L.J. 889 (1968).
154. 431 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968):
The elements of due process required by [the Gault] decision all deal with the
"proceedings" or hearing where a "determination is made as to whether a juvenile is
a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part". The quantum of proof
required to make a "determination" of the alleged delinquency is a vital element of
that proceeding. Although the court specifically considered "only the problems
presented to us by this case" we conclude the underlying reasoning of Gault logically
requires that a determination of delinquency is valid only when the facts of delinquency
are proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence
as now required by the present Texas decisions. We believe this is the clear and
unmistaken effect of that decision.
In In re Garcia, 443 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ), the juvenile court
instructed the jury to use "beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969), followed in E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. In Santana v. Texas, 90 S. Ct. 1350 (1970), the United States Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, granted the petition for the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case to the Texas Supreme Court for further consideration in the light of In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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interest to establish the case of the State as to the commission of the
crimes charged, corroborating evidence was not essential. 5 6
Preponderance applied equally to defenses as well as offenses.
When a child raised a defense such as insanity, he had the burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time
of the commission of the offense.'57 He need not have established
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The Disposition
Two functions are performed by the juvenile court. The first is
adjudication of delinquency, and the second is disposition of the
delinquent. Normally, the adjudication and disposition occur at the
same hearing. On occasion a motion for separate hearings has been
granted.'58 When both functions are handled at one hearing, evidence
inadmissible for the determination of delinquency could be admissible
for the determination of the disposition. With separate hearings, the
court has broad discretion in the use of hearsay and other information
not subject to cross-examination in determining disposition. In re
Gonzalez questioned what evidence was admissible after a
determination of delinquency but before the disposition.
Appellant's eighth point complains that the court heard and
considered evidence and testimony against appellant in private, and
not in the presence of appellant and deprived appellant of the
opportunity of confronting and refuting such testimony. The record
shows that the court announced his judgment of delinquency on the
day the matter was tried, and merely waited two or three days to
determine what disposition should be made of the delinquent. What
matters he heard or may have heard, or what information he may
have received or did receive during such interval would not, therefore,
touch on the matter of delinquency, but only on the extent and
156. 204 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin 1947, no writ); accord, In re Gonzalez,
328 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ rerd n.r.e.); Cantu v. State, 207
S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ).
157. State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. In In re Garcia, 443 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ), upon
motion by the child, a bifurcated trial before the jury was granted, first to determine delinquency
and then to determine the possible placement. Upon proper instructions, the jury determined the
appellant was a delinquent child and, for the best interest and welfare of the child and the
community in which he resided, he should be committed to the Texas Youth Council, Gatesville
State School for Boys. On the basis of the jury's findings, the appellant was found to be a
delinquent child, and upon the verdict of the jury and the decision of the court the appellant was
committed to the Youth Council for confinement in Gatesville for an indeterminate period of time
not extending beyond the time he reached 2 1.
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severity of the sentence. This has been held to be proper: In re Brown
(supra). This matter was tried without a jury, and we believe the court
was merely trying to obtain as much information so as to serve the
best interests of the child. This is a field where much latitude has been
indulged and, certainly, it has been done many, many times in other
courts, such as the Federal court where, after conviction, the matter
is submitted to a probation officer before the judge imposes sentence.
We think this point is without merit and must, therefore, be
overruled. 59
The 1907 juvenile court act authorized the juvenile court to make
three types of dispositions in regard to the delinquent child: to permit
him to remain at home, to place him in the home of suitable family.
or to commit him to a county or state institution.6 0 Confinement was
limited to those places stated in the juvenile court act:
[T]he court may commit it to any institution in the county that ,nav
care for children that is willing to receive it or which may be provided
for by the State or county suitable for the care of such children willing
to receive it, or of any State institution which may now or hereafter
be established for boys or girls, willing to receive such child, or to any
other institution in the State of Texas for the care of such children
willing to receive it.'
6
'
159. In re Gonzalez, 328 S. W.2d 475, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 7, at 139-40. Section 7 was codified as TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. tit. 33b, § 7 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2197 (1911), (1914),
and as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1203 (1911). This part of TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1203 (1911),
unaltered by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 9, at 218, was recodified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art.
1203 (1916).
161. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 7, at 13940. Other places, such as the county jail, were
not possibilities. Windham v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. 664, 150 S.W. 613 (1912). When the case was
heard on the criminal docket, the places of confinement were those described in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1895. Conley v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 370, 116 S.W. 806 (1909) (age at
trial governs). In 1909 the code was amended so that if the verdict was for confinement for 5
years or less the jury was no longer able to designate whether the juvenile was to be sent to the
training school or to the penitentiary but confinement was automatically in the training school.
Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 54, § I, at 100-01, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1145 (1895), was
codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1911). The proviso which had been added in 1889,
that "The jury convicting shall say in their verdict whether the convict shall be sent to the
reformatory or the penitentiary," was omitted. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § I, at 214, amending
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1911), was codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1195 (1916).
Accord, Dill v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 49, 219 S.W. 481 (1920); Ragsdale v. State, 61 Tex. Crim.
145, 134 S.W. 234 (191 I).
The law of suspended sentences applied to delinquency cases as well as to criminal felony
cases. In Hogue v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 170, 220 S.W. 96 (1920), the delinquency judgment was
reversed and the cause remanded because the jury was not instructed on the law of suspended
sentences.
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Although the 1925 and 1936 Codes of Criminal Procedure did not
enumerate the types of disposition as previous codes had done, the 1925
and 1936 Revised Civil Statutes did enumerate the previously
permissible types of disposition. 6 2 In 1940 the Attorney General of
Texas rendered an opinion that construed the revised civil statutes as
being limited by the three code of criminal procedure provisions that
pertained to verdict and judgment, term of commitment, and
substitution of place of confinement for juveniles.163 The legislature
reacted in 1941 by reenacting the provision in the revised civil statutes
and repealing all conflicting laws. 64
In all cases of confinement of male juveniles between 1907 and
1925, maximum commitment was limited to 5 years, or not beyond the
time when the child reached 21.165 For the female delinquent the
maximum commitment was not to be beyond the time when she
reached 21; there was no fixed maximum length of 5 years as in the
case of boys. 66 The 1925 code made a change, eliminating the
162. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1091 (1925), (1936), construed in Ex parte Hughes, I 1l Tex.
Crim. 66, 11 S.W.2d 319 (1928); Currey v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 265, 296 S.W. 307 (1927). TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338 (1925), (1936). For the application of the law of suspended sentences
after the 1925 codifications, see Meggs v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 136, 291 S.W. 545 (1927).
163. TEX. AT'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-2759 (1940). For legislative comment on this opinion,
see Tex. Laws 1941, ch. 193, § 3, at 355-56. The attorney general held that, where the court or
jury had found a juvenile to be a delinquent child, the child could be committed only to a place
or institution described by articles 1090 and 1091 of the code of criminal procedure. These
provisions, unlike TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338 (1936), did not authorize the court to commit
the delinquent child to the care and custody of an individual-a practice which has been prevalent
throughout Texas.
164. Tex. Laws 1941, ch. 193, § 1, at 355. The amended provision was identical to TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338 (1936) except for language. It was intended to take care of the
inconsistency in TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 1090-91 (1936).
165. In no case was commitment to be beyond the age of 21. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 7,
at 139-40, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 7 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2197 (191 I), (1914), and as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1203 (1911). This part
of TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1203 (1911), unaltered by Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 9, at 218, was
recodified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1203 (1916). Between 1909 and 1913 the length of
commitment for male juveniles was prescribed by statute at an indeterminate period of not less
than 2 nor more than 5 years. After 1913 the 2-year minimum was deleted but the 5-year limit
was retained. Tex. Laws 1909, ch. 55, § I, at 101-03, amending Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 9,
was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 9 (Supp. 1910). It did not appear in TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. arts. 2199, 2200 (1911), the corresponding articles of the 1911 codification. The
amended version of section 9 was codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1205 (1911). In 1913,
article 1205 was repealed. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 13, at 220. See Ex parte Bartee, 76 Tex.
Crim. 285, 174 S.W. 1051, 1053 (1915). The 5-year limit on confinement was retained in TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5231 (1914).
166. Ex parte Cain, 86 Tex. Crim. 509, 217 S.W. 386, 388 (1920) (female age 13 confined
to the girls' training school until 21); accord, Ex parte Chandler, 99 Tex. Crim. 255, 268 S.W.
749 (1925) (female age 14 committed for minority).
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maximum commitment of 5 years for boys, thus equalizing the
maximum for both boys and girls at 21.167
The 1943 statutes authorized the court to make one of the
following dispositions:
(1) place the child on probation or under supervision in his own
home or in the custody of a relative or other fit person, upon such
terms as the court shall determine;
(2) commit the child to a suitable public institution or agency,
or to a suitable private institution or agency authorized to care for
children; or to place them in suitable family homes or parental homes
for an indeterminate period of time, not extending beyond the time
the child shall reach the age of twenty-one (21) years;
(3) make such further disposition as the court may deem to be
for the best interest of the child, except as herein otherwise provided.'"
The choice of disposition was not left to the arbitrary discretion
of the juvenile court. There was a check on the court.
It is error for the trial court to commit a delinquent child to
others than the child's parents in the absence of evidence that such
167. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1090 (1925), (1936). In Uwanich v. State, 131 Tex. Crim.
623, 101 S.W.2d 567 (1937), the court held that, when a delinquent would attain her majority
before expiration of the maximum period of confinement assessed, reversal of the conviction was
not required when the disposition also provided that she should not be confined after she reached
21.
168. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 13, at 316-17, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-
1, § 13 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964). These
alternatives remained unchanged in the 1965 and 1967 amendments to section 13. Tex. Laws 1965,
ch. 577, § 5, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1966); Tex. Laws 1967,
ch. 475, § 6, codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1968).
In addition, the court was authorized to adjudge that a parent or other responsible person
shall pay for the support of the committed child. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 13-A, at 317,
codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13-A (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13-A (1964).
The court could order physical and mental examinations, Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 16,
at 317, codified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 16 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 16 (1964):
The Court may cause any person coming under its jurisdiction to be examined by
a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist, appointed by the Court. If it is determined
that the child is either feebleminded or mentally ill, it shall be the duty of the Judge of
the Juvenile Court to proceed to have the necessary legal steps taken to have said child
adjudged feeble minded or insane.
The fact that the juvenile under juvenile court law could be incarcerated for a longer period
than an adult tried for the same crime does not violate equal protection or due process of the
14th amendment. Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ refd
n.r.e.). The court rejected a similar argument based on cruel and unusual punishment in R.R. v.
State, 448 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
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parents are not proper persons to have the care, guidance and custody
of such minor, or that it is for the best interest of such minor and
the State that he be committed to the custody of others than his own
parents.'
But this appears not to have remained the law for very long. In Dudley
v. State7' the court held:
We find nothing in the statute which requires the custody of
delinquent children to be placed with their parents if they are fit and
proper persons to have such custody. If that were the law, no child
of exemplary parents, with a good home, could ever be placed in the
Gatesville State School for Boys or in any place other than the home
of its parents. The provision of the statute is that, when the juvenile
is found to be a delinquent child, the court may, by order duly
entered, proceed (1) to place him on probation in his own home or
place him in the custody of a relative or other fit person, (2) commit
him to a suitable public institution or agency or (3) make such further
disposition as the court may deem to be for the best interest of the
child. This does not mean that the court must first eliminate the
question of whether or not the parents are suitable persons to have
the child's custody before the second alternative may be considered
nor that the second alternative must be eliminated before the court
can consider the third alternative. It simply places upon the court the
duty of exercising its sound discretion and make such provision for
the custody of the juvenile as will serve the child's welfare and the best
interest of the State. In concluding the question of custody, probation
and supervision of the child, the court should consider the disposition
and conduct of the child as reflected by the testimony and place him
in one or the other of the environments designated by the statute
which, in the judgment of the court, will best carry out the purpose
of the law and secure for the child such care and guidance as will tend
to correct any wayward tendencies that might be shown to have
caused or contributed to his delinquency.
When a jury was impaneled, under the early statutes, the trial
judge was without power or authority to fix the punishment. The guilt
of the accused, as well as the amount of his punishment, was a matter
exclusively within the province of the jury. 7 ' In 1943 when the
169. Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901,904 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ).
170. 219 S.W.2d 574, 575 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ ref'd); accord, Lazaros v.
State, 228 S.W.2d 972, 976 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, no writ).
171. Gebhardt v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 25, 218 S.W. 1047 (1920). TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art.
1089 (1925), (1936) required the jury to state in its verdict the time and place of confinement.
Curry v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 265, 296 S.W. 307 (1927) (jury should be allowed to choose the
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authority of the jury was limited to the finding of delinquency, the
assessment of disposition became the province of the court. Under
either system, after the initial assessment of punishment, the juvenile
court retained the power to change the disposition.'
A proper juvenile court judgment had to define and set out the
truth of the particular matter which constituted the accused a
delinquent child and had to specify both the time and place of
confinement.' 7 3 At times the court would commit error by setting a
confinement period exceeding that permitted by statute or by failing to
state the maximum commitment time.'74 With the change in
institutional names, a verdict directing confinement in an institution
which no longer existed was initially viewed as fatally defective. It
could not be corrected by a judgment that provided for confinement
in an institution which did exist, since the judgment was considered
inconsistent with the verdict. 7 ' In 1918 a milder view was taken.
place of confinement). In Stewart v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 145, 8 S.W.2d 140 (1928)
(verdict-Boys' Training School at Gatesville; judgment-Boys' Training School in Coryell
County), the court held that if the proper place of confinement was not designated in the
judgment, it could be corrected on appeal. Here, the only state juvenile training school was located
in Gatesville, Coryell County.
The jury was required to find in its verdict in express terms that the defendant was not over
the juvenility age. Byrd v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 390, 116 S.W. 1146 (1909).
172. Pre-1943: Ex parte McDowell, 76 Tex. Crim. I, 172 S.W. 213 (1914) (juvenile court
ordered the child discharged from industrial school and returned to his parents). TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 2338 (1925), (1936). Cf Exparte Lassiter, 113 Tex. Crim. 18, 18 S.W.2d 637 (1929).
Post-1943: Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, §§ 13, 14, at 316-17, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. SrAT.
art. 2338-1, §§ 13, 14 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 13,
14 (1964); Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 5, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13
(Supp. 1966); Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 6, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13
(Supp. 1968). See Ex parte Maldonado, 148 Tex. Crim. 358, 187 S.W.2d 223 (1945); Reyna v.
State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ); In re Fisher, 184 S.W.2d 519
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, no writ). In 1965 section 14 was amended to exclude cases
transferred to criminal court. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 6, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
art. 2338-1, § 14 (Supp. 1966).
The juvenile court was given power to require reports from the institution, association, or
person to whose care the child was committed. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 8, at 140, codified as
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. tit. 33b, § 8 (Supp. 1908); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2198 (1911), (1914);
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1204 (1911), (1916). Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 10, at 219, did not
alter TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1204 (1911).
173. Ex parte Burkhart, 94 Tex. Crim. 583, 253 S.W. 259 (1923); Guinn v. State, 88 Tex.
Crim. 509, 228 S.W. 233 (1921); Exparte Roach, 87 Tex. Crim. 370, 221 S.W. 975 (1920); Ex
parte Brooks, 85 Tex. Crim. 252, 211 S.W. 592 (1919).
174. Ex parte Roach, 87 Tex. Crim. 370, 221 S.W. 975 (1920) (judgment void because there
was neither a beginning nor an ending of the confinement nor anything as to the duration of
confinement); Ex parte Brooks, 85 Tex. Crim. 252, 211 S.W. 592 (1919) (8-year confinement
made judgment void); Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389 (1918) (court could
reform judgment to be for an indeterminate period).
175. Zimmer v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 114, 141 S.W. 781 (1911).
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The name of the school or institution at Gatesville has been
changed from time to ime by statute. There can be no doubt from
the charge of the court, verdict, and judgment that the institution at
Gatesville, providing for the training of male juveniles, was meant and
intended so that while therein said institution is called the "juvenile
training school" that would be no ground for a reversal of the
judgment herein. Such calling it would undoubtedly be embraced
within the said juvenile statute. 7 '
The 1925 Revised Civil Statutes required that the court's order
committing the child must prescribe the length of time and the
conditions of the commitment. 17 7 The judgment did not have to recite
specifically that the accused was adjudged a delinquent, 78 but unless it
stated the duration of the term of commitment it was void.' 7' The court
of criminal appeals had the power to reform a judgment."'
The 1943 act retained the requirement that the judgment must
state the duration of the commitment. In Steed v. State the supreme
court held the judgment to be uncertain and indefinite as to when the
minors should be discharged from Gatesville in that it did not state the
dates of their 21st birthdays nor did it contain any other data from
which it could have been determined when the term of their
commitment would end.
It would serve no useful purpose to direct the trial court to correct
this error in the judgment as provided for in Rule 434, because there
was no testimony, as reflected by this record, introduced before the
trial court from which such information could be ascertained.'18
Clerical errors in the date when the juvenile would reach 21 could be
reformed without making the entire judgment void. 82
4. Appeal
Although the 1907 juvenile court act did not expressly provide for
176. Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389, 390 (1918).
177. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 2338 (1925), (1936).
178. Morgan v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. 434, 25 S.W.2d 842 (1930) (motion for rehearing).
The finding by the court that accused was under 17 fixed his status as a juvenile. When the verdict
and judgment found that he violated a penal law, it brought him within the status of a delinquent,
notwithstanding the omission of a specific recital in the judgment.
179. Exparte Douglas, 109 Tex. Crim. 463, 5 S.W.2d 153 (1928).
180. Phillips v. State, 20 S.W.2d 790, 792 (lex. Crim. App. 1929) (motion for rehearing)
(reformed from a term of years not less than 4 to not more than 4).
181. Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458, 460 (1944); accord, Ballard v. State,
192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, no writ).
182. In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(October 16, 1957, reformed to October 16, 1967).
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appeal from the juvenile court, appeals were permitted at first."8 Then
in 1915 the court of criminal appeals refused to accept appeals from
the juvenile court:
[W]e do not think an appeal would lie to this court from a trial
adjudging one a delinquent child, but that on habeas corpus an appeal
would lie, or we would have authority to issue an original writ, to
determine whether or not one had been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this law, and whether or not one was illegally restrained
of his liberty. 4
The court again changed positions in 1918. It held that prosecution and
conviction under the delinquency statutes were criminal proceedings,
and that for any claimed error in the trial resort should be to a direct
appeal to the court of criminal appeals, not a writ of habeas corpus. '"
In 1918 a provision was added which directed that an appeal could be
taken to the court of criminal appeals."61 Habeas corpus could still be
used to attack a void judgment." 7 Since juvenile proceedings were
183. Windham v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. 664, 150 S.W. 613 (1912). Habeas corpus was
available also. Exparte McDowell, 76 Tex. Crim. I, 172 S.W. 213 (1914).
184. Ex parte Bartee, 76 Tex. Crim. 285, 174 S.W. 1051, 1057 (1915); accord, Ex parte
Ramseur, 81 Tex. Crim. 413, 195 S.W. 864 (1917); Klopner v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 232, 189
S.W. 268 (1916); Horn v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 407, 181 S.W. 727 (1916); Mills v. State, 77 Tex.
Crim. 129, 177 S.W. 492 (1915).
185. Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389, 391-92 (1918) (motion for
rehearing); Exparte McLoud, 82 Tex. Crim. 299, 200 S.W. 394, 397 (1917).
186. Tex. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, ch. 26, § 1, at 44, amending TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 1197 (1916). Accord, Ex parte Meggs, 99 Tex. Crim. 391, 269 S.W. 790 (1925); Ex parte
Burkhart, 94 Tex. Crim. 583, 253 S.W. 259 (1923); Exparte Cain, 86 Tex. Crim. 509, 217 S.W.
386, 388 (1920); Tippins v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 205, 217 S.W. 380 (1919) (appeal dismissed
because of the absence of a final judgment); Exparte Brooks, 85 Tex. Crim. 252, 211 S.W. 592
(1919); Exparte Davis, 85 Tex. Crim. 218, 211 S.W. 456 (1919).
TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1093 (1925), (1936):
A prosecution and conviction of a juvenile shall be regarded as a criminal or
misdemanor case, and an appeal lies from such conviction directly to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas, the appeal to be governed by the same rules as apply in
cases of misdemeanors.
187. Evidence sufficient that no complaint was filed, or that no warrant or capias was
issued, or in the case of an infant with parents living in the vicinage that no notice was
given them, and no opportunity afforded for a trial by jury, or to be represented by
counsel of her own or their choice-any one of these would constitute an attack upon
the judgment which should be permitted, and, if sustained by the evidence, the judgment
should be held void and the relator released.
Ex parte Cain, 86 Tex. Crim. 509, 217 S.W. 386, 387-88 (1920); accord, Ex parte Johnson, 131
Tex. Crim. 438, 99 S.W.2d 598 (1936); Ex parte Tomlin, 107 Tex. Crim. 643, 298 S.W. 902
(1927); Ex parte Burkhart, 94 Tex. Crim. 583, 253 S.W. 259 (1923) (judgment failed to set out
time and place of confinment); Guinn v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 509, 228 S.W. 233 (1921) (when
judgment recited notice, the fact question of notice was for trial court and not for court of
JUVENILE COURT EVOLUTION
considered criminal, the bills of exception were required to be filed
within the period granted for criminal, not civil cases."M Without notice
of appeal being given and entered in the record, the appeal would be
dismissed 189
When the juvenile procedure was changed from criminal to civil
in 1943, appeal was no longer to the court of criminal appeals. The
new route for appeal was to the court of civil appeals, with access to
the Texas Supreme Court by writ of error or upon certificate, as in
other civil cases. 90 Habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
an appeal' although it could be used to attack a void judgment."2
The strict rules of appellate procedure, however, were held
inapplicable.
The legislature no doubt realized that in many instances the child
proceeded against would be of tender years, and intended that such
proceedings, in respect to his right of appeal, should not be
encumbered by any hard and technical rules of procedure. The Act
itself gives any party interested the right of appeal and makes no
provision for an appeal bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, but says the
Act shall be liberally construed. Considering the Act in its entirety
and the purpose for which it was enacted, we do not believe that it
was the intention of the legislature that a bond or affidavit in lieu
thereof should be required as a prerequisite to his right of appeal." 3
This was expanded to include the parents' right to a transcript and
statement of facts, without cost, although no appeal bond or deposit
criminal appeals on application for a writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Roach, 87 Tex. Crim. 370,
221 S.W. 975 (1920).
188. Bradshaw v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 216, 6 S.W.2d 230 (1928).
189. Hostetter v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 102, 36 S.W.2d 165 (1931). Prior to appeal the
defendant was required to file an appeal bond or recognizance if he was not in custody; otherwise
his appeal would have been dismissed. Reyes v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 310, 174 S.W.2d 323 (1943).
190. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 21, at 318, codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 21 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 21 (1964),
construed in In re Garcia, 443 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ). For a case
caught in the middle of the changing procedure, see Ex parte Maldonado, 148 Tex. Crim. 358,
187 S.W.2d 223 (1945); Maldonado v. State, 184 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1945, no writ).
191. Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, no writ); Mozingo
v. Mitchell, 220 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin 1949, no writ).
192. Exparte Yelton, 298 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ).
193. In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
But cf. State v. Garza, 358 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no writ) (under
TEx. R. Civ. P. 324 motion for new trial was prerequisite to appeal). This result was reaffirmed
in Lee v. McKay, 414 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ dism'd).
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in lieu of an appeal bond had been filed.' 9 In 1969, the Texas Supreme
Court restricted the right to appeal and transcript. It held that when a
juvenile is financially able to do so he must pay, or give security for,
the costs of his appeal. This limited free appeals and transcripts to
those who would qualify under the pauper's oath. " When a juvenile
has been declared a delinquent and escapes custody during the
pendency of the appeal, and is still at large, he has not forfeited his
right to the appeal. A motion by the state to dismiss the appeal would
not be in order.'96
5. Problems Subsequent to Juvenile Court Proceedings
a. Juvenile Court Records and Evidence
Beginning in 1907 juvenile court records were kept separate from
criminal court records." '7 Subsequent use of the disposition and
evidence gathered in delinquency proceedings was limited to other
juvenile court proceedings."18 This did not make one who testified in a
194. In re Garcia, 443 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ); Ciulla v.
Hardy, 431 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ); Hernandez v. Hardy, 426
S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ); Lee v. McKay, 414 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ.
App. -San Antonio 1967, writ dism'd).
195. Brenan v. Court of Civil Appeals, 14th Dist., 444 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1969).
196. Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston '1949, no writ).
197. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 2, at 138. Section 2 was codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
tit. 33b, § 2 (Supp. 1908) and recodified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2192 (1911), (1914), and
as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1198 (1911), (1916).
198. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 65, § 1, at 137-38. Section I was codified as TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. tit. 33b, § I (Supp. 1908) and recodifed as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2191 (1911), (1914);
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1197 (1911), (1916); and as TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 1092 (1925), (1936),
construed in Monday v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 44, 60 S.W.2d 435 (1933); Lott v. State, 123 Tex.
Crim. 591, 60 S.W.2d 223 (1933); Schafer v. State, 121 Tex. Crim. 452, 51 S.W.2d 356 (1932);
Jimenez v. State, III Tex. Crim. 359, 13 S.W.2d 93 (1929); O'Rear v. State, 110 Tex. Crim.
490, 9 S.W.2d 333 (1928) (witness, convicted as a delinquent child, was competent to testify in
liquor prosecution); McGuffey v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 365, 296 S.W. 552, 554 (1927) (motion
for rehearing). A similar provision appeared in the 1943 statutes: Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 13,
at 316-17, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964). This did not apply to evidence gathered during
juvenile court investigation but not introduced in juvenile court hearings. Dearing v. State, 151
Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947). In 1965 section 13 was amended to exclude the child who
has been transferred to criminal court under section 6. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 577, § 5, codified
as TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1966). In 1967 section 13 was amended again.
This time a perjury exception was added to the status provision and the use-of-evidence provision
was rewritten. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 6, codifed as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 13
(Supp. 1968).
The defendant could not be cross-examined as to the result of juvenile proceedings for the
purpose of impeachment or to prevent a suspended sentence. Smith v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 124,
18 S.W.2d 1070 (1929); Robinson v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 345, 7 S.W.2d 571 (1928) (motion
for rehearing).
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juvenile hearing incompetent to testify in a criminal trial.' 99 Also, once
the juvenile court became authorized to certify an older child to
criminal court to be treated as an adult, the juvenile court act did not
prohibit proof of the child's general reputation for being a peaceable
and law-abiding citizen, upon a trial of the child as an adult.2 00 In 1943
the statutes also provided for the confidentiality of the juvenile
record .01
b. Plea of Former Conviction
Between 1907 and 1943, if the accused was declared a delinquent,
a plea of former conviction would bar criminal prosecution for a felony
on the identical offense on which the delinquency conviction was
predicated.20 2 When the procedure was changed to civil, the plea of
former conviction would not apply since it would be applicable only
to a prior criminal conviction.203 With the change in procedure, there
was no prior criminal conviction.204 As long as separate offenses were
specified in the delinquency petition and in the criminal indictment the
court felt justified in rejecting the former conviction argument. In 1963
when identical offenses were used the court resolved:
We need not here concern ourselves with a consideration of the
question of former conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction or
199. Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961) (Tex. Laws 1957, ch.
281, § 33, at 668, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5143d, § 33 (1958), TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5143d, § 33 (1964)).
200. Banda v. State, 424 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (rape); Broadway v. State,
418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (16-year-old tried for rape).
201. Tex. Laws 1943, ch. 204, § 15, at 317, codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2338-
I, § 15 (Supp. 1943), (1948), and TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 15 (1964):
Juvenile Court records shall not be inspected by persons other than probation
officers or other officers of the Juvenile Court unless otherwise directed by the court.
202. Van Hatten v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 123, 260 S.W. 581 (1924); see Smith v. State, 99
Tex. Crim. 402, 269 S.W. 793 (1925). For an unsuccessful attempt to force the former conviction
issue, see Osborne v. Brooks, 75 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
203. See Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
204. Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961) (delinquency petition
based on aggravated assault of Lethcoe and murder of Ruble, and criminal charge based on
murder with malice aforethought of Ruble); Martinez v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 443, 350 S.W.2d
929 (1961) (delinquency petition based on assault with intent to rob, and criminal charge based
on murder); Perry v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 282, 350 S.W.2d 21 (1961) (delinquency petition based
on unlawfully carrying a pistol, and criminal charge based on murder); Wood v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 307, 349 S.W.2d 605 (1961) (after the incident, the training school refused to release the
juvenile and he was subsequently tried in criminal court for assault with intent to murder with
malice); Roberts v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 308, 219 S.W.2d 1016 (1949) (after the murder, parole
from juvenile training school was revoked and child became of age for criminal trial 2 years later);
Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947) (also separate and distinct offenses;
burglary committed 5 days prior to murder).
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of former jeopardy based upon a proceeding, civil in nature, in the
Juvenile Court prior to indictment. In addition to jeopardy, denial of
due process in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is presented.
The record herein shows without dispute that as a result of the
state having invoked the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court upon the
allegation that the appellant herein committed the murder for which
he was indicted, tried and convicted after he reached the age of 17,
the appellant was committed and remained in custody and under
control of the State School for Boys until he was indicted and taken
into custody to answer said indictment.
It is interesting to note that the sentence was credited as for time
spent in jail (Art. 768, Vernon's Ann. C.C.P.), the provision being
"said sentence to begin and operate from and after the 21st day of
July, A.D. 1961, the date of defendant's incarceration."
As has been stated, the verdict finding the appellant herein to be
a delinquent child was returned on July 21, 1961.
To affirm this conviction in the light of the record would be to
hold that, for an offense committed before he reached the age of 17
years, the offender who has committed no other offense against the
law may, upon petition of the district attorney, be adjudged a
delinquent child and held in custody as such, and without regard to
how he may respond to the guidance and control afforded him under
the Juvenile Act, be indicted, tried and convicted for the identical
offense after he reaches the age of 17.
We sustain appellant's contention that such a conviction violates
the principles of fundamental fairness and constitutes a deprivation of
due process under the 14th Amendment.2 5
This did not change the court's position when the delinquency petition
and the criminal indictment were not identical, 2 0  nor was there a
205. Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963), noted in I HOUSTON L.
REv. 281 (1964).
206. Ex parte Miranda, 415 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (delinquency petition
alleged burglary and sodomy, and indictment alleged murder); Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552(Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (delinquency petition alleged theft from a person, and indictment alleged
murder); see Ex parte Martinez, 386 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (delinquency petition
alleged assault with intent to rob, and criminal indictment alleged murder) (court based decision
on fact that jeopardy did not attach in juvenile court because proceedings were civil); Solis v.
State, 418 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, no writ) (delinquency petition alleged
assault with intent to murder; 15-year-old defendant's attempt to raise murder with malice charge
to preclude subsequent criminal prosecution was unsuccessful).
There existed some difference in opinion as to when the delinquency petition and the criminal
indictment were for identical offenses. In Ex parte Sawyer, 386 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964), the court of criminal appeals held that the delinquency petition did not allege either murder
although evidence of both was introduced in the delinquency hearing. Thus prosecution in criminal
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change in the inapplicability of the double jeopardy contention because
of the different nature of the two forums.20 7
In 1967 the possibility of a subsequent criminal conviction was
eliminated by statute:
No person who has been adjudged a delinquent child may be
convicted of any offense alleged in the petition to adjudge him a
delinquent child or any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile
judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the juvenile
proceeding.20s
Still left uncovered was the case in which probation or parole was
revoked because of the incident and the child was later tried in criminal
court for it.
In 1968 the court of civil appeals in Collins v. State209 upheld a
double jeopardy contention based on two juvenile court hearings.
A juvenile delinquency trial is a civil proceeding conducted in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure except insofar as
special statutes are applicable. Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183
S.W.2d 458; Gamble v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 405 S.W.2d 384; Art.
2338-18, Sec. 18, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. St. However, since it is a
proceeding which seeks to deprive the defendant of his liberty, the
defendant is guaranteed all of the privileges and immunities which he
would have if it were a criminal proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed. 2d 527. Among those rights is'the right to
be tried in accordance with due process, including the immunity from
twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Sawyer v. Hauck,
D.C., 245 F. Supp. 55; Garza v. State (Tex.Cr.App.), 369 S.W.2d 36;
court for the murders was not barred. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas viewed them as identical.
Since the indictments, trials and convictions in causes Nos. S-61553 and S-61554
were for the same acts and offenses for which petitioner had been previously adjudged
a delinquent child and confined in the Gatesville State School for Boys, they violated
fundamental fairness and constituted a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The convictions were ordered set aside and the juvenile returned to the Texas Youth Council.
Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55, 57 (W.D. Tex. 1965); accord, Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216
(5th Cir. 1968).
207. Roberts v. Beto, 245 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
208. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 7, at 1086, codified as TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 30, § 3
(Supp. 1969-1970).
209. 429 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ). For a discussion of
the double prosecution problem, see Steele, The Doctrine of Multiple Prosecution in Texas, 22
Sw. L.J. 567, 578-79 (1968); Comment, Age and Related Jurisdictional Problems of the Juvenile
Courts, 36 TExAs L. REv. 323 (1958).
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Art. 1, Sec. 14, Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon's Ann.;
Art. 1.10, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Vernon's Ann.
If on January 4, 1968, this defendant was placed in jeopardy
pursuant to a charge that he stole some tires from Alphonse Kanuses,
then his subsequent trial on February 8, 1968, for the same offense,
would obviously be in violation of that privilege of immunity.
McLelland v. State (Tex.Cr.App.), 420 S.W.2d 417; Davis v. State,
144 Tex.Cr.R. 474, 164 S.W.2d 686.
We are of the opinion that the record before us indicates an
intention on the part of both the State and the defendant that the
January 4th trial be a trial on the charge of stealing tires from
Alphonse Kanuses. It is not at all inconsistent with the applicable
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that issues be tried by consent without
written pleadings being on file at the time the evidence is presented.
Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W.2d 562; Chambless v. J. J.
Fritch, General Contractor, Tex.Civ.App., 336 S.W.2d 200, writ ref.,
n. r. e.; Rules 66 and 67, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case
the State got the Court's permission to file a trial amendment and
the defendant agreed thereto. While the State did not then and there
file a written trial amendment, later, without any dismissal of the
case, another pleading was filed in the same numbered case pleading
the facts which, according to the oral representations made by the
attorney for the State to the court and the defendant, were to be
included in the trial, amendment. Thus, we are of the opinion that the
defendant was, on January 4, 1968, placed in jeopardy of a charge of
stealing tires from Alphonse Kanuses. Therefore, his subsequent trial
and conviction on February 8, on that same offense, was a violation
of his constitutional protection from twice being placed in jeopardy
for the same offense.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is here
rendered for the defendant that he be released from the custody of the
Texas Youth Council.
c. Criminal Prosecution Prior to Discharge from Juvenile Court
Juvenile court jurisdiction attaches to a male under 17 and a
female under 18 and continues until he or she becomes 21 or is
discharged prior to becoming 21. Once the juvenile becomes 17 or 18,
depending on sex, the criminal court may prosecute even though he or
she is under a commitment from the juvenile court.2 0
210. Leos v. State, 410 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Wood v. State, 171 Tex. Crim.
307, 349 S.W.2d 605 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
The 63-year history of the Texas juvenile court is one exhibiting
constant flux. Jurisdictionally, the definition of the delinquent child has
changed in both the acts that constitute delinquency and the age of the
delinquent. The courts eligible for designation as juvenile courts and the
method of selection have been altered. The current trend involves a shift
from part-time juvenile courts to full-time domestic relations courts.
Procedurally, despite the change from criminal to civil procedure,
many of the basic safeguards have been retained-right to counsel,
right to jury trial, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to
notice of the charge. Some alterations have occurred in applying the
safeguards. More care must be taken in observing the rights of the
child.

